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The increasingly severe and irreversible effects of climate
change around the world make adaptation to a changing climate
an immediate and urgent global priority, as the Paris Agreement
on Climate Change acknowledged. Yet adaptation investment-
to make communities and ecosystems more resilient to climate
change-has been slow to materialize. Closing the finance gap
and rising to the challenge of adaptation requires two conceptual
shifts in how we think about adaptation law and governance. The
first is that optimal adaptation is a public good, much like a
healthy climate or safe streets. Everyone is better off in a resilient
community that can thrive despite climate impacts, whether they
contributed to resilience or not. This means adaptation
investment will likely continue to be underprovided by the market
in the absence of an effective legal regime. The second shift is that
adaptation is not merely a local matter, though it is still largely
treated as such. In several important scenarios, it will also be an
international public good requiring international cooperation.
Parties to the Paris Agreement seemingly recognized this when
they described adaptation as a "global challenge" with "local,
subnational, national, regional and international dimensions."
However, they did not consider what this means in practical
terms for law and governance, and the literature is still largely
silent on this issue.
This Article seeks to move the analysis forward. It makes
three principal contributions. First, building on economic
analysis of collective action problems, externalities, and public
goods, it develops an analytical framework to examine the
* Graham Fellow, University of Toronto Faculty of Law, and Visiting Attorney,
Environmental Law Institute. I am grateful to Markus Benzie, Steven Bernstein, Sander
Chan, Bruce Chapman, Matthew Hoffmann, Tiffany Morrison, John Robinson, and
Michael Trebilcock for their thoughtful comments, as well as the participants of the
Stockholm Environment Institute, European Society of International Law, and
University of Toronto Environmental Governance Lab workshops, at which early drafts
of this Article were discussed. The analysis has benefited from data access and insights
from organizations discussed below. I would like to thank in particular Annett M6hner
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adaptation challenge and similar cross-cutting legal issues. In
particular, it reconceptualizes climate adaptation as a multi-level
public good (MLPG)-with domestic, transboundary, and global
dimensions. Second, it explores the implications of this
conceptual shift for institutional and legal design at each level of
governance. It considers the efficacy of different market-based
mechanisms (Coasean private contracting) and prescriptive
regulation in the light of this framework and explores the
distinctions between the domestic and the international realms.
Third, it proposes a multi-level governance model that could help
produce what I call "optimal adaptation" and help optimize legal
design. In particular, it identifies three priority areas for
institution building in the transboundary setting that pose
particular challenges for legal design. This framework will open
avenues for more granular and critical study of the legal design
and contracting required to rise to the challenge of multi-level
public goods.
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The increasingly severe and irreversible effects of climate change
around the world make adaptation' to a changing climate an
immediate and urgent global priority, as the Paris Agreement on
Climate Change acknowledged.2 International action on mitigation
remains vital,3 but even if states were to aggressively reduce their
greenhouse gas emissions today, climate impacts-such as record
floods and droughts, superstorms, wildfires, falling crop productivity,
and coastal erosion-have by now become unavoidable in many
regions, as any benefits of new emissions reductions would not be felt
for decades.4 Originally estimated at $100 billion per year,5 the cost of
climate adaptation in developing countries alone could rise to between
$280 and $500 billion annually by 2050.6 Developed countries are not
spared either. According to estimates, weather- and climate-related
disasters have cost the US economy at least $240 billion a year over
the past decade.7 In 2017 alone, the United States suffered sixteen
1. Adaptation is defined in this Article as an adjustment in activities to avoid or
moderate the expected harm from climate change or its effects. Cf. INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND
VULNERABILITY 172 (2014) [hereinafter IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014],
https://www.ipec.ch/pdflassessment-report/ar5/wg2/WGIIAR5-IntegrationBrochure
FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NSE-HDK9] (archived Aug. 25, 2018) (Adaptation is "the
process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects. In human systems,
adaptation seeks to moderate or avoid harm or exploit beneficial opportunities. In some
natural systems, human intervention may facilitate adjustment to expected climate and
its effects.").
2. Paris Agreement, art. 2(b), Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No 16-1104 [hereinafter
Paris Agreement]. The Paris Agreement is annexed to Decision 1/CP.21 adopted in Paris
by Parties to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) on Dec.
12, 2015. See UNFCCC, Rep. of the Conf. of the Parties on its Twenty-First Session,
Adoption of the Paris Agreement (Decision 1/CP.21), U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1
(Jan. 29, 2016) [hereinafter UNFCCC Decision 1/CP.21]. UNFCCC documents are
available at http://unfcc.int/.
3. Paris Agreement, supra note 2, art. 2(a).
4. U.N. ENV'T PROGRAMME FIN. INITIATIVE CLIMATE CHANGE WORKING GRP.,
ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY TO CLIMATE CHANGE: THE ROLE OF THE FINANCE
SECTOR 3 (2006), http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/CEO-briefing-adaptation
vulnerability 206.pdf [https://perma.cclLSZ8-B483] (archived Aug. 25, 2018).
5. WORLD BANK GRP., THE ECONOMICS OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE:
SYNTHESIS REPORT 3 (2010), https://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTCC/Resources/
EACCFinalSynthesisReport0803_2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/D96B-XRJX] (archived
Aug. 25, 2018).
6. U.N. ENV'T PROGRAMME, THE ADAPTATION FINANCE GAP REPORT xii (2016),
http://climateanalytics.org/files/agr2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/C79X-BUCP] (archived
Sept. 11, 2018).
7. Stephen Leahy, Hidden Costs of Climate Change Running Hundreds of
Billions a Year, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC (Sept. 27, 2017),
https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/09/climate-change-costs-us-economy-billions-
report/ [https://perma.cclW9X5-PJNJ] (archived Aug. 25, 2018).
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such disasters with losses exceeding $1 billion each, causing 362
fatalities and $306 billion in damages-setting a new US annual
record.8
A large share of the projected losses can be avoided through
preventive adaptation,9 but investment has been slow to materialize.
As this Article explains, the adaptation finance gap is problematic not
only for the directly impacted communities, but also for international
society as a whole since climate vulnerability in one part of the world
could in some cases compromise resilience in the rest of the world.
Part of the implementation challenge is conceptual and requires
two shifts in how we think about adaptation law and governance. First,
while it is widely accepted that climate mitigation is a public good
(since one actor's mitigation actions, no matter where or how small,
will benefit everyone else10), climate adaptation is not usually thought
of in these terms.1 1 However, optimal adaptation, this Article argues,
should be treated as a public good-a good that can be enjoyed by many
for free, like national defense or clean air. Everyone is better off in a
resilient community that can withstand and continue to thrive despite
climate impacts, whether they contributed to resilience or not. This
encourages free-riding. As such, we would expect that adaptation
investment will continue to be underprovided by the market in the
absence of an effective legal regime. Meanwhile, poorly designed
adaptation could generate negative externalities, which we would
expect to be oversupplied.
8. Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters: Overview, NATL OCEANIC &
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., NAT'L CTRS. FOR ENVTL. INFO.,
https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/overview (last visited Sept. 18, 2018)
[https://perma.ccIB8BU-67G3] (archived Aug. 25, 2018). The full costs for Hurricanes
Harvey, Irma and Maria are still being assessed. See Leahy, supra note 7.
9. WORLD ECON. FORUM, CLIMATE ADAPTATION: SEIZING THE CHALLENGE 4
(2014), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GAC/2014/WEFGACClimateChange
AdaptationSeizingChallengeReport_2014.pdf [https://perma.ccl2VC8-6FSL] (archived
Aug. 26, 2018) (noting that "[u]p to 65% of the increase in the projected losses due to
climate change could be averted cost effectively through adaptation investment").
10. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001:
MITIGATION607 (Bert Metz et al. eds., 2001) https://www.ipc.ch/ipccreports/tar/wg3/pdf/
WGIIITAR full report.pdf [https://perma.cc/V697-72BW] (archived Aug. 26, 2018)
[hereinafter IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001]; cf. NICHOLAS STERN, STERN REVIEW: THE
ECONOMIcs OF CLIMATE CHANGE 24-25 (2006), http://mudancasclimaticas.cptec.inpe.br/
-rmclimapdfs/destaques/sternreview report complete.pdf [https://perma.cc/UKG5-
DNGK] (archived Aug. 26, 2018) ("In common with many other environmental problems,
human-induced climate change is at its most basic level an externality. Those who
produce greenhouse-gas emissions are bringing about climate change, thereby imposing
costs on the world and on future generations, but they do not face directly, neither via
markets nor in other ways, the full consequences of the costs of their actions. . . . The
climate is a public good. . . .").
11. But see Emma Tompkins & Hallie Eakin, Managing Private and Public
Adaptation to Climate Change, 22 GLOBAL ENvTL. CHANGE 3 (2012) (discussing private
provision of adaptation public goods); cf. STERN, supra note 10, at 37 (ascribing to
adaptation some limited public good features).
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Second, even though research on climate adaptation and
resilience is expanding rapidly across disciplines, adaptation is still
largely treated as a local matter. Consequently, positive international
externalities of optimal adaptation (and negative externalities of
maladaptation) are overlooked in the literature.1 2 This is an important
oversight. While climate adaptation in many cases will be a pure
domestic public good (governable by domestic laws), in some scenarios
it will also be a transboundary or a global public good requiring
international cooperation. Parties to the Paris Agreement recognized
this in Article 7(2), where they described adaptation not only as a
"global challenge," but also one that has "local, subnational, national,
regional and international dimensions."13 However, they did not
consider what this means in practical terms for international law and
governance.
To date, there has also been little effort in the literature to identify
these layers of governance, examine critically their implications for
legal design, or explore what role international law and institutions
could play in encouraging optimal adaptation across levels. This
Article aims to fill those gaps. It provides a preliminary analysis of how
a multi-level public good like climate adaptation should be governed to
meet the Paris Agreement's and national adaptation objectives. It
contributes to legal literature and policy by refraining the issue,
proposing a new analytical framework, and identifying priority areas
for institution building. Specifically, it makes four contributions. First,
it reconceptualizes climate adaptation as a multi-level public good,
comprising domestic, transboundary, and global levels. Second, it
explores the implications of this conceptual shift for institutional
design and international law. Third, it outlines the contours of a multi-
level governance model that could help produce optimal adaptation in
a transboundary setting. Finally, it identifies three priority areas for
international adaptation law and governance. While this Article is
12. Even a recent special feature on adaptation governance did not address
transboundary risks and governance. See THE GOVERNANCE OF ADAPTATION, ECOLOGY
& Soc'Y (David Huitema et al. eds., 2016), https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/
view.php?sf=87 [https://perma.cc/M98Y-VNCP] (archived Sept. 11, 2018); see also Declan
Conway & Johanna Mustelin, Strategies for Improving Adaptation Practice in
Developing Countries, 4 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 339 (2014); Oliver Schenker &
Gunter Stephan, Give and Take: How the Funding of Adaptation to Climate Change Can
Improve the Donor's Terms-of-Trade, 106 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 44, 44 (2014) ("[W]hile
benefits of mitigation are independent of where emissions are abated, benefits of
adaptation are primarily local. In other words, mitigation is a global public good that
requires internationally coordinated efforts whereas adaptation is more likely to be
implemented locally with sufficient pace and scope . . . [and] without global
coordination."); T. Kato & J. Ellis, Communicating Progress in National and Global
Adaptation to Climate Change 2, 9, 14 (OECD Climate Change Expert Group Paper No.
2016(1), 2016).
13. Paris Agreement, supra note 2, art. 7(2).
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primarily concerned with the international legal realm, the same
analytical framework could also be employed to engage with the
adaptation challenge in the domestic setting-among federal states,
counties, and cities.
The remainder of the analysis proceeds as follows. First, the
Article develops a new analytical framework to reframe the adaptation
challenge and considers the efficacy of market-based mechanisms
(private contracting) and prescriptive regulation in the light of this
framework (Part II). It introduces the concept of optimal adaptation (a
public good), to be distinguished from maladaptation (a public bad),
which reduces system resilience. It shows that inadequate provision of
adaptation is essentially a public goods problem and that a coherent
legal framework is required to restructure economic incentives, enable
coordination, and remove barriers to adaptation investment. Further,
it develops the concept of multi-level public goods and distinguishes
between three levels of optimal adaptation: domestic, transboundary,
and global. It defines optimal adaptation as a pure domestic public good
where its provision can be ensured by the domestic legal system or
private contracting. Where optimal adaptation cannot be guaranteed
by domestic laws, it will require cross-border mechanisms that are able
to anticipate and respond to the collective demand for such goods.
Adaptation as a- transboundary public good (which involves a smaller
number of often-neighboring states) is conceptually distinct from
adaptation as a global public good (which affects the international
community as a whole) and requires different institutional design.
Second, the Article reviews current governance arrangements (Part
III). It finds that adaptation governance is already multi-level in the
sense that adaptation is being addressed by a number of domestic and
international institutions, but these initiatives are largely focused on
adaptation's local aspects.
Third, it attempts to draw the line between different levels of
adaptation in concrete terms (Part IV). It shows that optimal
adaptation will most likely be a transboundary public good where
domestic water or food security depends on access to shared resources,
while it will be a global public good where local climatic impacts can
destabilize international peace and security. Fourth, it proposes a
multi-level law and governance model to address cross-border
externalities (Part V). In particular, it shows that international law
can steer state policies towards optimal adaptation; however, many
regimes require updating, while others are yet to be built. It concludes




II. THE ADAPTATION CHALLENGE
Before turning to current governance arrangements and optimal
institutional design, this Part first considers the challenges posed by
climate adaptation for legal design and develops a comprehensive
analytical framework to examine how this and similar types of public
goods can be governed. First, it defines "optimal adaptation," to be
distinguished from maladaptation (Part II.A). Second, it explains why
optimal adaptation is a public good and why adaptation measures can
give rise to positive or negative externalities (Part II.B). Third, it shows
that optimal adaptation, depending on the context, can function as a
domestic, transboundary, or a global public good (Part II.C). Finally, it
analyzes the tools for dealing with public goods and environmental
externalities (such as private contracting and regulation) at each level
of governance and identifies particular difficulties encountered in the
cross-border setting (Part II.D).
A. Optimal Adaptation vs. Maladaptation
As noted above, "adaptation" means an adjustment in activities to
avoid or moderate the expected harm from climate change or its
effects.1 4 For example, as climate change increases the pressure on
water resources, a municipality may decide to adapt by investing in a
desalination plant to diversify its water supply and insulate the
community from the range of risks associated with water scarcity. But
not every adaptive action is optimal. In the above example, the
municipality's adaptive measures would not be optimal if the
construction and operation degraded the ecosystem or if it increased
carbon emissions. By creating negative externalities, such measures
would be a form of maladaptation (a public bad), which the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (the IPCC) has defined
as "[a]ctions that may lead to increased risk of adverse climate-related
outcomes, increased vulnerability to climate change, or diminished
welfare, now or in the future."15 Maladaptation thus has both a spatial
and a temporal dimension.
Therefore, optimal adaptation, as understood in this Article,
refers to adaptation measures that maximize social welfare by
strengthening community and ecosystem resilience and reducing
overall vulnerabilityl6-without causing negative externalities (such
14. See IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014, supra note 1.
15. Id. at 183; see also IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001, supra note 10; Jon Barnett
& Saffron O'Neill, Maladaptation, 20 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 211, 211-12 (2010)
(discussing other definitions of maladaptation).
16. Cf. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Rep. of the Conf. of the
Parties on Its Sixteenth Session, ¶ 11, The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the Work
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as pollution or overfishing).1 7 Whether adaptation is optimal in any
given case is context dependent, but, at a minimum, it assumes there
are no adverse local or cross-border spillovers now or in the future.18
This concept is explored in the next subpart.
B. The Problem of Externalities and Coordination
As with many other issues in environmental, energy, or natural
resource law, a key barrier to optimal adaptation is the presence of
externalities-the costs, or benefits, of an actor's economic activity that
do not accrue to that actor but are borne by wider society. Pollution is
an example of a negative externality that causes lasting harm to
society but is not a cost to the polluter (it is "external" from the
polluter's perspective). When the cost of negative externalities (e.g.,
pollution, loss of habitat, or harm to public health) is not factored into
the analysis, the market will tend to focus on the private benefit of a
given economic activity, while overlooking its social cost. Accordingly,
in the absence of environmental regulation or private contracting,
negative externalities will tend to be overproduced. Positive
externalities, in contrast, will tend to be underproduced. A beekeeper,
for example, may only calculate the cost and revenue of honey
production, and not the tremendous value his bees generate for the
neighboring orchards and may maintain fewer beehives than is
societally optimal. In other words, there is a divergence of economic
incentives between the individual actor and the rest of society.19
of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action Under the Convention
(Decision Dec. 1/CP.16), U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (Mar. 15, 2011) (adaptation
actions are "aimed at reducing vulnerability and building resilience," especially in
developing countries).
17. Thus, measures where local benefits exceed non-local costs (or future costs)
would not be "optimal" (or Pareto-optimal) because they leave nonconsenting third
parties worse off. This does not mean there can be no balancing of costs and benefits, but
the wronged party would be entitled to compensation in the event of serious harm
(similar to Kaldor-Hicks efficiency). Cf. Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto:
Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211, 1221, 1223-25 (1991) (discussing
compensation); see also MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, DEALING WITH LOSERS: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF POLICY TRANSITIONS 1-2 (2015) (few policy changes make "somebody better
off and nobody worse off').
18. On difficulties of measuring effectiveness, see generally SUCCESSFUL
ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE: LINKING SCIENCE AND POLICY IN A RAPIDLY
CHANGING WORLD (S. Moser & M. Boykoff eds., 2013); W. N. Adger et al., Successful
Adaptation to Climate Change Across Scales, 15 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE (2005)
[hereinafter Adger, Successful Adaptation]. See also Jim W. Hall et al., Proportionate
Adaptation, 2 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 833 (2012), https://www.nature.com/articles/
nclimatel749 [https://perma.cclVJF5-PFNF] (archived Aug. 26, 2018) (applying a cost-
benefit approach).
19. See generally ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 134 (4th ed.
1932). See also Robert Cooter, Normative Failure Theory of Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV.
947, 951 (1997) (describing the Pigovian prescription as "markets for private goods,
government for public goods, taxes for externalities"); K. WILLIAM KAPP, THE SOCIAL
1034 [voL. 51:1027
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This has particular implications for climate adaptation, which is
in itself a public good, like public safety or street lighting. Public goods
can be understood as a special case of positive externalities: in their
purest form, public goods offer benefits that cannot be confined to a
single person, and, once provided, can be enjoyed by many for free.
Public goods are thus characterized by two properties: non-rivalry and
non-excludability.20 Consequently, public goods, like positive
externalities, will tend to be underproduced without regulatory
intervention or private contracting.
The benefits of optimal adaptation likewise extend beyond the
original investor. A homeowner who weatherproofs her home, for
example, will enjoy personal security during a storm. But the action
could also benefit her neighbors (by reducing the risk of backed-up
drains and storm runoff on their property) and the community (by not
imposing a cost on the emergency services). Thus, when an actor
invests in optimal adaptation, its actions generate not only private
benefits, but also benefit society as a whole by strengthening ecosystem
and community resilience (e.g., by maintaining a functioning society or
operations). Likewise, if an actor fails to take adaptive measures, or
takes maladaptive measures, it could expose society to climate risks-
from a homeowner who funnels her rain runoff onto her neighbors'
property to systemic breakdowns in the food supply or water shortages.
Local floods that shut down car and electronics factories in Thailand in
2011, for example, disrupted global supply chains.
21
Public benefits increase with scale. Everyone is better off in a
resilient community that can thrive despite climate change. For
example, if a city invests in flood defenses or urban greenbelts, all of
its inhabitants will enjoy the benefits of resilience regardless of
whether and how much they contributed to those efforts. So will every
COSTS OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 35-41 (2d ed. 1975); MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS
OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 58-77 (1994) (discussing costs to third parties).
20. While pure public goods are both nonexcludable and nonrivalrous (e.g., clean
air), common pool resources (CPRs) are nonexcludable but rivalrous: one actor's use
reduces availability for others (e.g., drinking water). For purposes of this Article focusing
on MLPGs, this distinction is not material and both types are referred to simply as public
goods. To see the evolution of theory of public goods, see Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure
Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387 (1954); Paul A. Samuelson,
Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditure, 37 REV. ECON. & STAT. 350
(1955); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS (1965); Richard A. Musgrave, Provision for Social Goods, in PUBLIC
ECONOMICS (J. Margolis & H. Guitton eds., 1969); Elinor Ostrom & Vincent Ostrom,
Public Economy Organization and Service Delivery (1978) (Paper for "Financing the
Regional City Project" Meeting of the Metropolitan Fund, U. Mich.),
http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/handle/10535/732/ostrom01.pdf'sequence=l&i
sAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/844Z-RUR5] (archived Aug. 26, 2018).
21. Ben Bland & Robin Kwong, Supply Chain Disruption: Sunken Ambitions,
FIN. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2011), https://www.ft.com/content/6b2Odl92-0613-11el-adOe-
00144feabdcO [https://perma.cc/S6L5-SAPT] (archived Aug. 26, 2018).
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visitor, who will not have contributed at all. This creates an incentive
to free-ride.
What does this mean in practice? A flood barrier, for example,
would strengthen the resilience of a city's riverfront and of the
neighboring jurisdictions. But since the positive externalities of
adaptation are not internalized, the city will weigh only its own
(private) costs and benefits of construction and will not consider the
(external) resilience benefits to its neighbors. Absent coordination and
cost-sharing with its neighbors, the city may conclude that the project
is too costly and decide against adaptation investment.
Conversely, damming a river might compensate for lower water
levels and strengthen the resilience of a county's residents, but would
decrease the amount of water available downstream. Here, the
negative externalities of adaptation are not internalized, which means
that, in the absence of coordination or contractual mechanisms
between the riparian counties, the upstream county would receive the
entire benefit of adaptation, while the downstream county would bear
much of the cost (resulting in maladaptation). So long as the adverse
impacts of its actions are felt elsewhere, the upstream county will lack
incentives to engage in optimal adaptation-unless the affected
downstream county is able to impose effective countermeasures or
disincentives.
There are additional risks of maladaptation that do not hinge on
flawed cost-benefit analysis. For example, even where individual
actors find adaptation to be in their self-interest, their (uncoordinated)
actions could become maladaptive in the absence of coordination,
private contracting, and enforcement mechanisms. Coordination and
common standards would also help support adaptation investment by
leveling the playing field and ensuring that actors who do implement
a long-term adaptation framework are not placed at a competitive
disadvantage relative to their peers in the short run (even though they
might reap the benefits down the road).
As the foregoing discussion suggests, optimal adaptation will
likely be underprovided by the market in the absence of a coherent
legal regime that can restructure economic incentives, enable
coordination, and help actors internalize the positive externalities of
climate adaptation and the negative externalities of maladaptation.
We can expect this to be true at all levels of governance omestic,
transboundary, and global-but especially where climate adaptation
or its impacts cross national boundaries.22 As shown below, the need
for a legal framework is greatest where climate adaptation requires
access to shared transboundary resources, where local adaptation
measures risk having direct and significant negative transboundary
22. See infra Part I.B.
1036 [VOL. 51:1027
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externalities, and where individual states, acting in isolation, cannot
ensure optimal adaptation.23
C. Multi-Level Public Goods
If optimal adaptation is a public good, the next question is scale:
is adaptation a local, domestic, transboundary, or a global public good?
How we answer that question will drive how we set up our institutional
and legal design.
Public goods generally can be local (e.g., noise control near, an
airport), domestic (e.g., control of toxic waste), transboundary (e.g.,
control of acid rain), or global (e.g., climate mitigation).24 But some
public goods, as this Article shows, are multi-level. That is, they do not
lose their public goods features as we move spatially up the level of
governance (as we zoom out from a large-scale to a small-scale map).
For purposes of this Article, the following three levels are most
relevant: domestic, transboundary, and global, as shown schematically
in Figure 1 below:
23. See infra pp. 1071-72.
24. See MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF. & MINISTRY OF ECON., FIN. & INDUSTRY,
GovT OF FRANCE, GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS § 2.1 (2002),
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdflbiens-publ-gb.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z88M-
RXSI (archived Aug. 26, 2018). This refers to the spatial or geographic area where the
good will be nonrivalrous and nonexcludable, which is distinct from the appropriate level
at which the public good should be managed (which could be situated at a higher level of
governance). Id.
2018] 1037
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Pure Domestic Public Good Can be supplied by a coherent
(Local, municipal, provincial, domestic legal framework or
sectoral, national, etc.) private contracting
Transboundary Public Good
Affects two or more States
(bilateral or regional) Needs effective international





community as a whole (e.g., UN
Security Council's purview)
Figure 1: Multi-Level Public Goods
As defined in this Article, optimal adaptation will be a pure
domestic public good where its provision can be ensured by a coherent
domestic legal framework (including private contracting) and
effectively implemented under the "country-driven" logic of the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 25 The
term "domestic" encompasses all forms of adaptation that can be
undertaken within a given state (i.e., local, municipal, provincial,
sectoral, national). Where adaptation is a pure domestic public good, it
will make sense for adaptation measures and policy planning to be
governed at the level closest to where the impacts of climate change
are experienced.2 6
This is not to suggest hat domestic adaptation is straightforward.
Optimizing adaptation within a state (as opposed to across states) can
give rise to complex coordination challenges and externalities between
cities, counties, and private actors. For example, individual Londoners'
decisions to pave over their front gardens may have been rational, but
in the aggregate "led to a loss of permeable drainage surface equivalent
to twenty-two times the size of Hyde Park."2 7 This significantly
increased the risk of flash floods, impacting future generations living
25. See infra Part III.
26. See infra Part I.A.
27. STERN, supra note 10, at 420.
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in London.2 8 While this Article focuses on transboundary coordination
problems, the analytical framework developed here to analyze multi-
level public goods can also be used to address questions of legal design
in purely domestic cases involving similar multi-level governance
challenges.
By contrast, optimal adaptation will be a transboundary or a
global public good where it would be undersupplied by the domestic
system alone. Transboundary public goods affect two or more states:
they can be bilateral or regional.2 9 Global public goods concern the
international community as a whole; as explained below, these are the
kinds of issues that might fall within the purview of the UN Security
Council.3 0 In both cases, optimal adaptation cannot be guaranteed by
domestic laws or by delivering on the policies laid out in the individual
National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) or Nationally Determined
Contributions (NDCs):3 1 it will also depend critically on inter-state
cooperation and a legal regime that can anticipate and respond to
changes in the collective demand for such goods. These concepts are
described in more detail below. But, first, the next subpart considers
how externalities and public goods are generally governed.
D. Overcoming Externalities
In the domestic context, the legal regime capable of redressing the
problem of externalities and the kinds of public goods concerns
3 2
discussed above has generally taken two forms: "command-and-
control" regulation and private contracting among market
participants. Command-and-control, or prescriptive regulation, aims to
either remove or reduce negative externalities directly (by prohibiting
particular activities) or indirectly (by imposing Pigovian taxes
3 3 or
liability regimes to induce the market to internalize the costs). The ban
on the pesticide DDT and carbon taxes or tradable permits are both




29. See infra Part IV.B.1.
30. See infra Part IV.B.2.
31. See infra Part V.
32. See, e.g., J. Horowitz & K. McConnell, A Review of WTA/WTP Studies, 44 J.
ENVTL. EcON. & MGMT. 426, 430 (2002) (discussing examples of environmental public
goods).
33. See generally PIGOU, supra note 19.
34. Both approaches focus on changing the actors' economic incentives based on
the assumption that actors are rational and self-interested. That is not always the case.
See, e.g., Rebecca Stone, Legal Design for the 'Good Man,' 102 VA. L. REV. 1767, 1770
(2016) (noting that "[m]any legal subjects are not exclusively motivated by self-interest,
and few are perfectly rational"). Actors also often voluntarily supply public goods instead
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However, as Ronald Coase has argued, regulatory fiat is not the
only way to control externalities.35 From the Coasean perspective, an
environmental problem exists because of a market failure (a failure to
fully account for external costs)3 6 and can be addressed through
private contracting. Assuming zero transaction costs and perfect
information, the theory predicts that the market can reach an efficient
(Pareto-optimal) outcome through mutually beneficial transactions
between the affected parties (e.g., the polluter and its neighbor) that
would increase both parties' net benefits without needing government
intervention. In other words, depending on the relative gains, either
the polluter could compensate its neighbor (buy the "right to pollute"),
or the neighbor could pay the polluter not to pollute (buy the right to
enjoy its own property). The negotiated outcome could in theory
achieve environmental protection more efficiently than regulation.3 7
Indeed, private contracting arrangements based on well-defined
private property rights (or a market for tradable permits) are common
in domestic environmental law, where they have been applied to
everything from groundwater licenses and fishing quotas to acid rain
abatement.
With more players, transaction costs increase, as does the
incentive to free-ride on others' efforts. In such cases, it is widely
assumed that, in the absence of prescriptive regulation, a "pumping
race" (or a "grazing race") will ensue as each actor tries to extract as
much of the common good as possible, come what may. This is the basic
premise of Garrett Hardin's "tragedy of the commons,"3 8 as well as the
intuition behind the Prisoner's Dilemma game, frequently used in law
and economics to illustrate the challenge of providing a public good
through voluntary actions.39 However, as Elinor Ostrom and others
of free-riding. See, e.g., Robert Sugden, Reciprocity: The Supply of Public Goods through
Voluntary Contributions, 94 ECON. J. 772 (1984). Moreover, actors' preferences are not
immutable. A change in social norms, culture, and norm-internalization could change
individual preferences-and environmental outcomes. See, e.g., Andrew Green, You
Can't Pay Them Enough: Subsidies, Environmental Law, and Social Norms, 30 HARV.
ENvTL. L. REV. 407 (2009); see also DANIEL BODANSKY, THE ART AND CRAFT OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 54 (2010) ("Taking [culture] off the table, as
economists typically do by treating it as a given, means that we give up one of the
potentially most powerful levers to effectuate environmental change."). However, this is
a more long-term proposition and is outside the scope of this Article.
35. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 18 (1960)
(noting that "direct governmental regulation will not necessarily give better results than
leaving the problem to be solved by the market").
36. See generally id.
37. See RICHARD LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 167, 183-84,
186-87 (2004) (discussing the theory behind market-based solutions).
38. See, e.g., Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244
(1968) ("Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all."); OLSON, supra note 20, at 2 (noting
self-interested actors will not protect a common good unless coerced or induced).
39. See Bruce Chapman, Rational Voluntarism and the Charitable Sector, in
BETWEEN STATE AND MARKET: ESSAY ON CHARITIES LAW AND POLICY IN CANADA 130 (Jim
Phillips et al. eds., 2001).
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have shown, under certain conditions private actors do voluntarily
cooperate in the management of shared resources, especially in small
communities.40
From an economist's perspective, the law's role is to clearly define
and assign property rights and minimize transaction costs; the effect
of the assignment on net efficiency is supposed to be neutral. In reality,
the law retains a critical responsibility for managing adverse impacts
of private activity, from assigning the initial property rights to
providing credible enforcement.4 1 In this sense, market-based schemes
are more effective as a supplement to rather than a substitute for
regulations42 (as regulations give rise to and enable the use of tradable
permits). Put differently, in a world of players with unequal power and
imperfect information, private contracting will be viable only because
an underlying regulatory regime exists to define its objectives, deter
free-riding, and enforce private contracts.
Whatever the merits of private contracting in the domestic
setting,4 3 there is a separate question of whether, and under what
circumstances, a Coasean solution can work once public goods or
externalities cross state boundaries.4 4 As explained below, though
basic resources (such as water) are typically governed locally, resources
rarely respect national boundaries.4 5 If a dispute emerges between two
cross-border communities over, say, water usage, the issue is not likely
to be handled directly by the parties. It is internationalized: any claims
would ultimately be espoused by the affected state against the other
state.46
40. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 112-14, 137-39 (1990) [hereinafter OSTROM,
GOVERNING THE COMMONS]. Ostrom focuses on small-scale CPRs (up to 15,000 users) in
a single country. Id. at 182; cf. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1993) (small-knit communities resolve disputes using
informal rules); Thomas Dietz, Elinor Ostrom & Paul C. Stern, The Struggle to Govern
the Commons, 302 SCI. 1907, 1908 (2003) (discussing conditions for cooperation).
41. Cf. Horowitz & McConnell, supra note 32, at 428 ("[Olne of the most
economically consequential decisions will be the initial establishment of the property
rights, especially for environmental and other public amenities for which property rights
are unclear."); Daren Acemoglu, Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict,
Commitment, and Politics, J. COMP. ECON. 620, 622 (2003) ("Underlying the Coase
theorem is the ability to write enforceable contracts . . . any enforcement problem
potentially limits the applicability of the Coase theorem.").
42. LAZARUS, supra note 37, at 201-02; cf. OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS,
supra note 40, at 121-36).
43. See infra Part W.A.
44. See infra Part IV.B.
45. See infra pp. 1058-59.
46. This is not to say that subnational governments cannot collaborate,
coordinate their actions, and align their legislation relating to shared resources-and
they increasingly do so. See, e.g., About Us, CONFERENCE OF GREAT LAKES AND ST.
LAWRENCE GOVERNORS AND PREMIERS, http://www.cglslgp.org/about-us/ (last visited
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On the surface, little difference may be apparent when moving
from the domestic to the international realm, or from domestic to
international public goods: bilateral and multilateral environmental
treaties are the product of direct bargaining among affected states. In
this sense, the inter-state solution to the problem of environmental
externalities or market failures is Coasean by definition. This is
especially true of transboundary problems involving just two
neighboring states-like the management of the Great Lakes by
Canada and the United States or the Rio Grande by the United States
and Mexico. But states can also control externalities in a multilateral
setting, for example, by creating an international market under the
Kyoto Protocol.4 7
In practice, the analogy soon begins to break down. The
international realm is difficult to reconcile with the Coasean model for
several reasons, especially where environmental externalities and
public goods are involved.
First, as noted above, the success of private contracting ultimately
rests on effective implementation and enforcement.4 8 While these are
supplied by the domestic legal regime, they are often lacking
internationally. This challenge is explored in more detail below.4 9
Second, a greater challenge may be the lack of perfect information.
The assumption that animates the entire Coasean model-that private
actors will have perfect (and symmetrical) information about the value
of environmental goods, the impact of negative externalities, or that
they will have a complete understanding of their preferences5 0-is
Oct. 15, 2018) [https://perma.cc/DG3R-RKM5] (archived Aug. 26, 2018). However, where
such efforts fail, the ultimate responsibility under international law rests with the State.
47. The Kyoto Protocol created three market-based "flexibility" mechanisms as a
"supplement" to domestic measures to reduce emissions: Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM), Joint Implementation (JI), and Emissions Trading (ET). See Mechanisms Under
the Kyoto Protocol, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
http://unfccc.int/kyoto-protocol/mechanisms/items/1673.php (last visited Oct. 15, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/VDH6-VHAJ] (archived Aug. 26, 2018). CDM enables industrialized
countries with an emissions reductions requirement ("Annex I" countries) to invest in
projects in developing countries ("non-Annex r countries) as an alternative to more
expensive emissions reductions at home. Meanwhile, JI enables industrialized countries
to meet part of their required emissions reductions by paying for projects in other
industrialized countries. Participants in the EU Emissions Trading System can use
international credits from CDM and JI towards fulfilling part of their obligations until
2020. Use of International Credits, EUR. COMM'N, https:/ec.europa.eu/climalpolicies/ets/
credits en (last visited Oct. 15, 2018) [https://perma.cc/A3RY-9EAC] (archived Aug. 26,
2018).
48. See sources cited supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
49. See infra pp. 1068-70.
50. Behavioral economics has problematized the notion of preferences. See, e.g.,
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, The Psychology
of Preference, 246 SCI. AM. 160 (1982); Richard Thaler, Anomalies: Saving, Fungibility,
and Mental Accounts, 4 J. EcON. PERSP. 193 (1990); Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded
Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449 (2003).
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questionable even in the domestic setting. It is especially doubtful in
the international arena populated by diverse states. Nor is it evident
that environmental goods can be adequately priced given their
intrinsic, intertemporal, and often sui generis nature.5 1
Third, Coasean contracting for transboundary adaptation poses
additional normative concerns. The model assumes that private actors
are indifferent between engaging in a particular activity (e.g.,
ranching, farming) and receiving monetary compensation.52 But states
and nonstate actors are unlikely to be indifferent between different
adaptation outcomes. Can one state sacrifice its citizens' resilience in
exchange for payment from another state and still comply with its
human rights or constitutional duties? Is it fair for the nonoffending
state to pay the offending state to prevent maladaptation? It is not
clear that resilience is the kind of a public good that can have a well-
defined marketplace (i.e., that it is possible to "trade" investment in
climate (mal)adaptation for increased payments to the adversely
affected states). As explained below, trading in maladaptation would
upend a number of established international norms, including the duty
not to cause transboundary harm, human rights obligations, and the
polluter-pays principle. The optimal adaptation regime would thus
need to protect both states' resilience.
The need for coherence and predictability is magnified by the
power asymmetries in the international system. State-to-state
bargains, especially in a bilateral situation, would favor the more
powerful party.5 3 In the absence of an international equivalent of
judicial review, it is not clear that a Coasean approach would actually
maximize net welfare. If there are distributional consequences across
states, the international system is not well equipped to address them.
In addition, as mentioned above, maladaptation can result in
negative externalities either now or in the future. When externalities
take place in the future, the bargain to be struck is not likely to be
effective, or fair, since the key affected parties are not represented at
the bargaining table. In other words, the negotiations, without more,
51. See, e.g., DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 165 (2009) ("To
presume that markets and market signals can best determine all allocative decisions is
to presume that everything can in principle be treated as a commodity."). Any bargain
would also need to accommodate changing conceptions of environmental public goods
over time (such as the benefits provided by ecosystem services).
52. As such, maximization of net benefits can animate a private bargain between
a cattle rancher and a farmer, where both parties' interests are in theory economic and
quantifiable.
53. Power asymmetry is also present in decentralized polycentric governance.
See, e.g., Tiffany Morrison et al., Mitigation and Adaptation in Polycentric Systems:
Sources of Power in the Pursuit of Collective Goals, 8 WIRES CLIMATE CHANGE Sept.-
Oct. 2017, at 1.
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cannot protect the interests of the nonconsenting future generations
that may bear the majority of the cost.
Finally, it is widely accepted that Coasean bargaining is least
applicable in situations involving a large number of parties (and
potential free-riders) and high transaction costs.5 4 We can expect this
to be the case for global public goods (such as climate change
mitigation), as well as for transboundary public goods that are regional
in nature (such as multi-state aquifers).55 In such circumstances,
domestically, an external arbiter is needed to help actors coordinate
their actions, protect their interests, and reduce the burden of
externalities.
But in the international realm, there is no higher power to impose
regulation. When states suffer the adverse effects of externalities, they
can try to induce changes in their neighbors' activities through
bilateral persuasion, institutions, or, in extreme cases, through force.
If states engage in self-interested behavior, there is very little to stop
them, as the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement in 2017 or
Canada's abandonment of the Kyoto Protocol six years earlier shows.
However, as explained below, this does not mean that transboundary
and global public goods are ungovernable.5 6 States bargain against the
backdrop of pre-existing treaty and customary rules defining their
rights and responsibilities. This legal context is equally useful in
building governance mechanisms and designing institutions capable of
producing optimal adaptation.
With this analytical framework in place, we can now turn to how
climate adaptation, with all its complexity, is currently governed.
54. As Coase himself observed, "there is no reason why, on occasion, such
governmental administrative regulation should not lead to an improvement in economic
efficiency. This would seem particularly likely when, as is normally the case with the
smoke nuisance, a large number of people is involved and when therefore the costs of
handling the problem through the market or the firm may be high." Cease, supra note
35, at 18.
55. Cf. SCOTT BARRETT, ENVIRONMENT & STATECRAFT: THE STRATEGY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-MAKING 355 (2003) ("Regional or minilateral environmental
problems are easier to remedy than global environmental problems.").
56. See infra Part V.
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III. CURRENT STATE OF CLIMATE ADAPTATION LAW & GOVERNANCE
Climate adaptation has been on the global climate agenda since
the signing of the UNFCCC in 1992,57 but its importance has increased
exponentially in recent years as harmful impacts of climate change
have continued to mount.58 Adaptation was assigned the same level of
priority as mitigation in the Cancun Adaptation Framework, adopted
at the Cancun Climate Change Conference in 2010.59 To promote
enhanced action on adaptation, the Cancun summit also established
an Adaptation Committee60 and created a process for the formulation
and implementation of National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), whose main
objective was to help Least Developed Country (LDC) Parties identify
their medium- to long-term climate risks and develop strategies to
reduce their vulnerability to climate change.6 1 In 2014, the Lima
summit invited all Parties to communicate their adaptation
undertakings or address adaptation in their Intended Nationally
Determined Contributions (INDCs). 6
2
The importance of adaptation-and adaptation finance-was
reaffirmed in the 2015 Paris Agreement. The new climate treaty
established the global adaptation goal "of enhancing adaptive capacity,
strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate
change."63 The Agreement does not require Parties to adopt any
specific adaptation targets. Instead, it calls on them to engage in
adaptation planning and implementation64 and to submit and update
57. See, e.g., U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change arts. 2, 4.1, 4.4,
May 9, 1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC].
58. See, e.g., U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Rep. of the Conf.
of the Parties on its Thirteenth Session, ¶ 1(c), Bali Action Plan (Decision 1/CP. 13), U.N.
Doc. FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1* (Mar. 14, 2008).
59. See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Rep. of the Conf. of the
Parties on its Sixteenth Session, ¶¶ 2, 11-35, The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the
Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the
Convention (Decision 1/CP.16), U.N. Doe. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (Mar. 15, 2011)
[hereinafter UNFCCC Decision 1/CP.16].
60. Id. ¶ 20.
61. Id. ¶ 15; U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Rep. of the Conf.
of the Parties on its Seventeenth Session, ¶ 1, National Adaptation Plan (Decision
5/CP. 17), U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 (Dec. 11, 2011).
62. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Rep. of the Conf. of the
Parties on its Twentieth Session, ¶ 12, Lima Call for Climate Action (Decision 1/CP.20),
U.N. Doe. FCCC/CP/2014/10/Add.1 (Dec. 14, 2014).
63. Paris Agreement, supra note 2, art. 7(1) ("Parties hereby establish the global
goal on adaptation of enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and
reducing vulnerability to climate change, with a view to contributing to sustainable
development and ensuring an adequate adaptation response in the context of the
temperature goal referred to in Article 2."); see also id. arts. 2(1)(b) & 7.
64. Id. art. 7(9).
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their "adaptation communications."6 5 Unlike mitigation, adaptation
reporting is voluntary.6 6
The UNFCCC approach to adaptation, as with mitigation, is
"country-driven."6 7 Adaptation communications and the Nationally
Determined Contributions (NDCs) (communications setting out each
country's climate vision and mitigation policieS6 8) are nationally
determined by design. This logic has shaped the work of the Adaptation
Committee6 9 and other bodies.70 This means that each country decides
65. Id. art. 7(10).
66. Id.
67. Id. arts. 7(5), 7(9). See also UNFCCC, Rep. of the Conf. of the Parties on its
Twentieth Session, ¶ 7(a), Long-Term Climate Finance (Decision 7/CP.22), U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2016/10/Add.1 (Nov. 14, 2014); UNFCCC Decision 1/CP.16, supra note 59, at
¶¶ 12, 20(a), 30, 32; U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Rep. of the Conf.
of the Parties on its Twenty-First Session, Report of the Adaptation Committee (Decision
3/CP.21), U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.2 (Jan. 29, 2016); U.N. Framework
Convention on Climate Change, Rep. of the Conf. of the Parties on its Twenty-First
Session, ¶ 7(a), National Adaptation Plans (Decision 4/CP.21), U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2016/10/Add.1 (Jan. 29, 2016).
68. The Paris Agreement does not require Parties to discuss adaptation in their
NDCs. Instead, it gives them the option of submitting their adaptation communications
as a component of or in conjunction with other documents, including their NAPs or
NDCs. See Paris Agreement, supra note 2, art. 7(11). While developed countries
generally see NDCs as focusing primarily on mitigation, many developing countries take
the view that NDCs should also address adaptation and support. For the former
perspective, see, for example, ENV'T & CLIMATE CHANGE CAN., CANADA'S SUBMISSION ON
APA ITEM 3: FEATURES, UP-FRONT INFORMATION & ACCOUNTING FOR NATIONALLY
DETERMINED CONTRIBUTIONS (NDCS) (2017),
http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/l75_356 1315023732
72845803-APA%201.3%20Item%203%20-%2Mitigation%20NDCEN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WT3U-F2MV] (archived Aug. 27, 2018).
69. See, e.g., Adaptation Comm., Rep. of the Adaptation Comm. for the Period
2016-2018, U.N. Doc. FCCC/SB/2015/2 (Oct. 20, 2015) (emphasizing adaptation at
household/community and national/regional evels); Adaptation Comm., Draft Outline of
a Report on Various Approaches to Adaptation, such as Community-Based Adaptation
and Ecosystem-Based Adaptation, Taking into Account Livelihoods and Economic
Diversification, U.N. Doc. AC/2017/6 (Mar. 1, 2017), https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/
ac18b-approaches.pdf [https://perma.cc/K35Y-5MQP] (archived Sept. 19, 2018);
Adaptation Comm., Technical Paper on Long-Term Adaptation Planning, U.N. Doc.
AC/2018/4 (Feb. 20, 2018) (discussing country-driven nature of adaptation planning,
https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/acl3_7blongterm-adaptation.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5CMB-9KS7] (archived Oct. 24, 2018).
70. See, e.g., UNFCCC LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES EXPERT GRP. (LEG), BEST
PRACTICES AND LESSONS LEARNED IN ADDRESSING ADAPTATION IN LEAST DEVELOPED
COUNTRIES 15 (2015), http://www4.unfccc.int/napDocuments%20NAP/50301_LEGUN
FCCCBPLL-vol3.pdf [https://perma.cclKF96-AB2K] (archived Sept. 12, 2018) (adopting
a country-driven approach); About the Adaptation Fund, ADAPTATION FUND,
https://www.adaptation-fund.org/about (last visited Sept. 19, 2018) [https://perma.cc/
CM2M-NRDN] (archived Aug. 27, 2018); Climate Change Adaptation, U.N. DEV'T
PROGRAMME, http://www.adaptation-undp.org/about (last visited Aug. 27, 2018)
[https://perma.ccl3APE-R8SG] (archived Aug. 27, 2018) (applying a "community-driven
approach"); Projects Table View, ADAPTATION FUND, https://www.adaptation-
fund.org/projects-programmes/project-information/projects-table-view (last visited Aug.
29, 2018) [https://perma.cclB57Y-HAMQ] (archived Aug. 29, 2018) (financing projects on
a community- or country-basis).
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for itself what adaptation "priorities, implementation and support
needs, plans and actions" (Art. 7(10)) it wants to focus on-without
necessarily taking into account the impact of its actions on its
neighbors or the effectiveness of its unilateral measures.7
1 As
explained below, this is a significant design flaw.
At the same time, the growing international focus on adaptation
has spurred considerable domestic action. After Finland published its
national adaptation strategy in 2005, the first country in the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to
do so,72 some twenty-four developed countries issued their strategies,
while seven are in the process of developing them.73 In April 2016, 137
out of 161 INDCs (covering 189 Parties, or 83 percent of all INDCs)
included an adaptation component.74 As of October 2018, 129 out of
177 NDCs submitted (or 73 percent) contained an adaptation
component.7 5 Moreover, by October 2018, eleven developing countries
had finalized their NAPs,76 while over eighty others were laying the
groundwork.7 7
In parallel, subnational and city-level adaptation planning has
steadily expanded, aided by transnational organizations and networks
71. The Paris Agreement's "bottom-up" design is matched with "top-down"
transparency, review, and reporting processes, whose purpose is to generate momentum
and increase ambition over time by informing the periodic global stock take. Paris
Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 7(14)(a), 7(14)(d), 13(5), 14.
72. Michael Mullan et al., National Adaptation Planning: Lessons from OECD
Countries 13 (Org. for Econ. Coop. & Dev., Env't Working Paper No. 54, 2013).
73. ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION:
EMERGING PRACTICES IN MONITORING AND EVALUATION 14 (2015) [hereinafter OECD,
NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE], https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/environment/national-
climate-change-adaptation_9789264229679-en#pagel [https://perma.cc/3EWS-Q5TE]
(archived Aug. 28, 2018).
74. This includes INDCs submitted by 46 LDC Parties. U.N. Framework
Convention on Climate Change, Aggregate Effect of the Intended Nationally Determined
Contributions: An Update (Synthesis Report), ¶¶ 7, 59, 252, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2016/2
(May 2, 2016) [hereinafter UNFCCC, Aggregate Effect].
75. UNFCCC Secretariat data on file with the author. Compare U.N. Framework
Convention on Climate Change, Adaptation-Related Information Included in Nationally
Determined Contributions, National Adaptation Plans and Recent National
Communication (Technical Paper by the Secretariat), at 3, U.N. Doc. FCCC/TP/2017/7
(Oct. 2, 2017) [https://perma.ccM8M9-XEA-P] (archived Sept. 2, 2018) (showing that, as
of October 2017, 108 out of 160 NDCs submitted (or 68 percent) contained an adaptation
component).
76. UNFCCC Secretariat data on file with the author. Cf. National Adaptation
Plans: NAPs from Developing Countries, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, http://www4.unfcc.int/naplPages/national-adaptation-plans.aspx (last visited
Aug. 28, 2018) [https://perma.cclKX4X-V4EY] (archived Aug. 28, 2018).
77. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Progress in the Process to
Formulate and Implement National Adaptation Plans (Note by the Secretariat), T 13,
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like the C40 network of the world's megacities, the International
Council for Local Economic Initiatives (ICLEI), and the World Mayors
Council on Climate Change.7 8
As these developments indicate, the governance of climate
adaptation is already multi-level in the sense that the issue is being
addressed, to varying degrees, by institutions at all levels.79 However,
the current architecture is decidedly mono-scalar in terms of its
geographic or spatial focus: most of the initiatives are concerned with
domestic measures (i.e., local or national) even though climate
adaptation has "local, subnational, national, regional and
international dimensions"8 0  and requires "international
cooperation."8 1
This Article thus draws a distinction between multi-level
governance in terms of the institutional structure (which is an apt
descriptor of the current framework) and multi-level governance in
terms of the policy focus (which is the direction in which, this Article
argues, adaptation needs to evolve).82 Figure 2 below visualizes the
difference between these two concepts:
78. ORG. FOR ECON. Coop. & DEV., ADAPTING TO THE IMPACTS OF CLIMATE
CHANGE 5 (2015), http://www.oecd.org/environment/cc/Adapting-to-the-impacts-of-
climate-change-2015-Policy-Perspectives-27.10.15%20WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/H2VX
-LYXA] (archived Aug. 29, 2018). While private actors and transnational networks also
participate in adaptation, this Article is primarily concerned with states given its focus
on transboundary issues requiring inter-state coordination.
79. At the international level, the Adaptation Committee is charged with
adaptation, but there is "significant" overlap in the functions performed by other
institutions. See Adaptation Comm., Review of the Work of Adaptation-Related
Institutional Arrangements under the Convention in 2017 (Background Note), ¶ 10, U.N.
Doc. AC/2017/3 (Mar. 2, 2017) [hereinafter Adaptation Comm., Review of the Work].
Though crowded, the current institutional landscape is still largely focused on domestic
adaptation. See also Adaptation Comm. & Least Developed Countries Expert Grp., Draft
Options for the Adaptation Committee and the Least Developed Countries Expert Group
to Address Decision 1/CP.21, paragraphs 41 and 45, T 18, U.N. Doc. AC-LEG/2017/1
(Mar. 3, 2017).
Other notable governance issues at the international level-such as lack of agreed
methodology to identify/track adaptation indicators, progress, or needs; lack of
developing country capacity to track indicators and integrate strategies at the
national/cross-sectoral evel; and difficulties with monitoring and evaluation-are
beyond the scope of this Article. See OECD, NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 73,
at 6, 9, 15; FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., THE AGRICULTURAL SECTORS IN
NATIONALLY DETERMINED CONTRIBUTIONS (NDCS): PRIORITY AREAS FOR
INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT 11 (2016), http://www.fao.org/3/a-i6400e.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5C5M-S3H4] (archived Sept. 12, 2018); Kato & Ellis, supra note 12, at 9-11.
80. See Paris Agreement, supra note 2, art. 7(2) ("adaptation is a global challenge
faced by all with local, subnational, national, regional and international dimensions");
see also UNFCCC, supra note 57, TT 14(f), 18.
81. Paris Agreement, supra note 2, art. 7(6); UNFCCC, supra note 57, ¶ 13.
82. In discussing multi-level governance (or scales), the literature typically
focuses only on the former. See, e.g., Adger, Successful Adaptation, supra note 18, at 77-
79. Multi-level (institutional) governance as defined in this Article differs from
polycentric governance, which is defined in the literature as many centers of decision-
making that are formally independent of each other, but are nested within a larger
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reduction efforts, which are intrinsically connected with climate
adaptation, are evolving in a similar direction.8 5 The Adaptation Fund
recently endorsed several "concepts" or "pre-concepts" with a
transboundary dimension,86 including ecosystem-based management
or risk reduction plans in the Sahel, Lake Victoria Basin, Central Asia,
and along the Ecuador-Colombia border.8 7 Similarly, the UNFCCC
Secretariat recently acknowledged that avoiding maladaptation could
in some cases require "a metropolitan, regionally integrated andlor
watershed-oriented approach, which may be transboundary in
nature."8 8
The same concerns are increasingly echoed by the Parties in their
submissions to the UNFCCC Secretariat. For example, some Parties
have adverted to the need to focus on "sectoral issues," such as water,
forests, ecosystems, and "eco-regions," and to "develop[] approaches
that are transboundary in nature for issues that cut across national
borders."8 9 Others have suggested that assessments of impacts,
ing-climate (last visited Aug. 29, 2018) [https://perma.cc/YK6Z-59E2] (archived Aug. 29,
2018). Indeed, some of these initiatives focusing on the need for an ecosystem-based
approach (e.g., by looking at shared watersheds or transboundary waters) predate the
Paris Agreement. The GEF, in particular, has funded regional adaptation projects on
this basis. See, e.g., Glob. Env't. Facility, Evaluation of the GEF Strategic Priority for
Adaptation, U.N. Doc. GEF/ME/C.39/4 (Oct. 22, 2010); GLOB. ENV'T. FACILITY, GEF
PROGRAMMING STRATEGY ON ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE-LEAST DEVELOPED
COUNTRIES FUND SPECIAL CLIMATE CHANGE FUND (2014) https://www.thegef.org/sites/
default/files/publications/GEFAdaptClimateChangeCRAO.pdf [https://perma.cc/K4G
2-T9WT] (archived Aug. 29, 2018).
85. See, e.g., U.N. OFFICE FOR DISASTER RISK REDUCTION, REGIONAL ACTION
PLAN FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SENDAI FRAMEWORK FOR DISASTER RISK
REDUCTION 2015-2030 IN THE AMERICAS (2017),
https://www.preventionweb.net/files/52286-americasregionalactionplaneng.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4RPT-TEZH] (archived Aug. 29, 2018).
86. See Endorsed Concepts, ADAPTATION FUND, https://www.adaptation-
fund.org/projects-programmes/endorsed-concepts/ (last visited Aug. 28, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/Y2XG-J3WFI (archived Aug. 28, 2018) [hereinafter Endorsed
Concepts]; Proposals & Concepts Currently Under Review, ADAPTATION FUND,
https://www.adaptation-fund.org/projects-programmes/proposals-concepts-under-
review (last visited Aug. 29, 2018) [https://perma.cclE6FM-AB4E] (archived Aug. 29,
2018).
87. Endorsed Concepts, supra note 86.
88. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adaptation in Human
Settlements: Key Findings and Way Forward (Report by the Secretariat), ¶ 31(a), U.N.
Doc. FCCC/SBSTA/2018/3 (Feb. 19, 2018),
https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/docs/2018/sbstaleng/03.pdfdownload
[https://perma.cclVYZ4-CTNX] (archived Aug. 29, 2018). The EU, for example, already
supports its member states with transboundary issues by facilitating regional
adaptation strategies, as in the Baltic Sea region. Id. T 57.
89. Adaptation Comm., Review of the Work, supra note 79, ¶¶ 19; see also
Adaptation Comm., Synthesis of Submissions from Parties and Other Stakeholders, and
Next Steps for Developing Recommendations on Methodologies for Assessing Adaptation
Needs, 12, U.N. Doc. AC/2017/4 (Mar. 4, 2017) (recommending that the Adaptation
Committee consider transnational climate impacts at the regional scales); Adaptation
Committee: Fostering engagement of the agri-food sector in resilience to climate change,
U.N. CLIMATE CHANGE, https:/unfecc.intlevent/adaptation-committee-fostering-
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vulnerability, risk, and resilience also cover transboundary aspects.
For instance, one West African country whose territory includes four
major rivers (all of which are threatened by climate change) noted that
it could become a destination for nomadic pastoralists from
neighboring countries, which would further increase the pressure on
its already vulnerable river basins.9 0 Meanwhile, two major food-
exporting countries reported that the climate-vulnerability of their
agriculture and livestock sectors could translate into a global risk.9
1
The Adaptation Committee, however, has not yet formally agreed to
take the discussion of these issues forward.
These initiatives reflect the growing recognition that the present
focus on unilateral, country-driven adaptation measures will be futile,
if not harmful, in some cases. However, discussions of transboundary
dimensions of climate adaptation remain an exception and do not go
far enough in ensuring optimal adaptation, while the international
community has yet to engage meaningfully with the global dimension
of climate adaptation (which, as explained below, implicates
international peace and security).9 2 Similarly, while it is increasingly
clear that climate adaptation needs to strengthen the resilience of both
communities and ecosystems, ecosystem-based adaptation remains
difficult due to both data gaps and low awareness among
stakeholders.9 3 If Figure 2 (above) shows the current unidimensional
state of adaptation governance, Figure 3 illustrates what optimal
institutional design might look like:
engagement-of-the-agri-food-sector-in-resilience-to-climate-change (last visited Oct. 24,
2018) [https://perma.cc/6TTE-GYKDI (archived Oct. 24, 2018) (advertising a workshop
that took place in October 2018, discussing links between food security, trade, and
adaptation needs).
90. UNFCCC, Aggregate Effect, supra note 74, T 281.
91. Id. ¶¶ 281, 305; see also Adaptation Comm., Progress Report by the
Adaptation Committee's Working Group on the Technical Examination Process on
Adaptation, T 10, U.N. Doc. AC/2017/5 (Mar. 1, 2017) (raising the issue of the water-
energy-food nexus and transboundary adaptation in delta countries).
92. Cf. IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014, supra note 1, at 1227 ("Regional policies
and strategies for adaptation [in Africa], as well as transboundary adaptation, are still
in their infancy.").
93. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Outcomes of Work under
the Nairobi Work Programme on Impacts, Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate
Change Since May 2016 (Synthesis Report by the Secretariat), ¶¶ 29-30, UN Doc.
FCCC/SBSTA/2018/2 (Mar. 26, 2018), https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/02_1
.pdfdownload [https://perma.cc/7CP6-ZUF8] (archived Aug. 28, 2018). See generally
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adaptation Planning, Implementation
and Evaluation Addressing Ecosystems and Areas such as Water Resources (Synthesis
Report by the Secretariat), U.N. Doc. FCCC/SBSTA/2017/3 (Mar. 27, 2017),
http://undoes.org/en/FCCC/SBSTA/2017/3 [https://perma.cc/5C29-DDS2] (archived Aug.
29, 2018) (defining ecosystem-based adaptation).
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IV. F'INDING TH~E DIVIIIFINO, LINE
With this framework in place, this Part seeks to lifferentiate
b~etween adaptation as a domestic, a t ransboundary, and a global
public good (Parts IV.A -IV.B) before turning in the next Part to how
such goods should be governed.
A. Adaptation ams a urDm estie Puli ood
In most cases, the appropriate regulatory measures for adapt ation
will be highly localized and sector specific, because the underlying
climate risks and impacts are also highly localized and sector-specific.
Floods, droughts, and wildfires are all exp~erienced locally and require
a local response. As the Adaptation Committee noted in 20141, "[tlhere
needs to be a pr ioritizat ion of support of local act ion, w here adaptat ion
will happen."
This makes sense in many instances, Crafting a single global
adaptation goal in the Paris Agreement would not have been realistic.
nor would states have accepted a top-down adaptation mandate, There
is a great diversity of the Parties' national circumstances and
vulnerabilities to climate change owing to their part icul ar geographic
4. |o|T o:o i d




characteristics (e.g., length of coastline, elevation, biodiversity, forest
coverage, groundwater resources), population dynamics, and
socioeconomic situation-factors that are reflected in the wide range of
adaptation needs and priorities outlined in the individual INDCs.95
Moreover, even where states adopt an adaptation policy to comply with
their UNFCCC obligations, they still enjoy wide discretion with respect
to domestic implementation.
As discussed above, domestic public goods generally can be
managed, and externalities controlled, in two basic ways: through
prescriptive regulation or private contracting.9 6 Adaptation, however,
even at the most local level, will rarely involve just two private parties.
More often, it will require city- or region-wide solutions since climate
change affects natural ecosystems, built environments, human health,
and existing social, institutional, and legal arrangements.
9 7 Optimal
adaptation at all levels of domestic governance, from city districts to
the federal government, requires planning for a wide range of impacts
and their interlinkages, such as heat stress, floods, wildfires, and
blackouts, affecting large numbers of actors. The complexity and
diversity of issues and institutions involved means that domestic
adaptation will not lend itself easily to contractual bargains between
neighbors or affected community members.
9 8 It will require a
regulatory strategy to factor climate risks in a growing range of
decisions, from coastal development, zoning, and agricultural policies,
to freshwater conservation and endangered species protection. For
example, building codes and landscaping ordinances will need to be
updated to conserve water supplies, reduce susceptibility to heat
stress, and improve protection against extreme events.
9 9
Domestic legislation can aid optimal local adaptation by extending
the government's planning horizons, factoring in long-term climate
risks,1 00 internalizing externalities, and promoting coordination
among different levels of domestic governance. In addition, to prevent
local maladaptation, domestic authorities would need to avoid market
95. UNFCCC, Aggregate Effect, supra note 74, ¶¶ 63, 255-57.
96. See supra Part II.D.
97. See Rosina Bierbaum et al., Adaptation, in CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE
UNITED STATES: THE THIRD NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 671 (J. Melillo et al. eds.,
2014; STERN, supra note 10, at 422.
98. Cf. DON DEWEES, DAVID DUFF & MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, EXPLORING THE
DOMAIN OF ACCIDENT LAW: TAKING THE FACTS SERIOUSLY 270 (1996) ("[W]here there are
large numbers of victims, Coasian bargaining cannot take place."). See also LAZARUS,
supra note 37, at 40.
99. Bierbaum et al., supra note 97.
100. For example, South Australia's development planning policy calls for
consideration of sea-level rise in the first 100 years of a project's life. See Northcape
Props. Pty Ltd. v. District Council of Yorke Peninsula [2008] SASC 57 (Austl.) (upholding
planning authority's decision to refuse development permits for failure to account for
receding coastline under projected sea-level rise).
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distortions, such as keeping in place or adopting new regulatory
regimes for infrastructure that deter investment in resilience (such as
direct or indirect fossil-fuel subsidies); public insurance or planning
policies that encourage development in vulnerable areas (such as
coverage for flood-prone homes); and measures that underprice natural
resources.1 0 1 They would also need to consider indirect risks, such as
climate-related risks to financial stability.10 2
Domestic planning decisions are generally subject to judicial
review, which means that local courts can play an important role in
ensuring that such decisions are optimal from a public goods
perspective. While courts are not competent to promulgate a national
adaptation policy, they can provide a check on government decisions,
as they do in other areas of environmental and administrative law.103
Indeed, though it is early days, courts have successfully prevented
maladaptation in a number of recent cases in different jurisdictions.104
For example, judicial review of zoning decisions by Australian
courts has aided optimal adaptation by limiting development in coastal
regions and flood-prone zones, where negative externalities from
maladaptive development would be felt in the future (a form of inter-
temporal maladaptation).105 Similarly, judicial review can help ensure
that local authorities consider climate risks to other types of
infrastructure, including roads, sewage systems, and energy
installations.10 6 Courts can also help protect the availability of
freshwater resources by mandating governments to consider climate
impacts in a range of decisions, including groundwater extraction10 7
101. Cf. ORG. FOR ECON. Coop. & DEV ET AL., ALIGNING POLICIES FOR A Low-
CARBON ECONOMY 54-56, 144 (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264233294-en
[https://perma.cc/8353-QP78] (archived Aug. 29, 2018); STERN, supra note 10, at 355.
102. See Maria L. Banda, The Bottom-Up Alternative: The Mitigation Potential of
Private Climate Governance After the Paris Agreement, 42 HARV. ENvTL. L. REV. 325, 356
(2018).
103. This assumes that courts are neither usurping political powers nor abdicating
their duties of judicial and administrative review through excessive deference. Cf.
Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch C.J.,
concurring) ("[Wihatever the agency may be doing under Chevron, the problem remains
that courts are not fulfilling their duty to interpret the law and declare invalid agency
actions inconsistent with those interpretations in the cases and controversies that come
before them.") (emphasis in original).
104. See generally Maria L. Banda & Scott Fulton, Litigating Climate Change in
National Courts: Recent Trends and Developments in Global Climate Law, 47 ENvTL. L.
REP. 10121 (2017).
105. See, e.g., Gippsland Coastal Bd. v. South Gippsland SC & Ors, [2008] VCAT
1545 (Vict. Civ. & Admin. Trib.) (Austl.); Taip v. East Gippsland Shire Council, [2010]
VCAT 1222 (Austl.); Rainbow Shores Pty Ltd. v. Gympie Reg'l Council, [2013] QPEC 26
(Queensl. Plan. & Env't Ct.) (Austl.).
106. Complaint in Intervention, United States v. Miami-Dade County, Fla., No.
12-24400-FAM (S.D. Fla. June 25, 2013) (arguing that county's plan to retrofit sewage
treatment system in Biscayne Bay failed to address the risk of sea-level rise).
107. Alanvale Pty Ltd. v. Southern Rural Water [2010] VCAT 480 (Vict. Civ. &
Admin. Trib.) (Austl.) (upholding local water authority's denial of groundwater
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and economic development, in challenges to environmental impact
assessment or constitutional rights. For example, Colombia's
Constitutional Court invalidated legislation permitting oil, gas, and
mining operations in the nation's pdramo partly because of the nexus
between climate change, water, and biodiversity in this fragile high-
altitude ecosystem. 108 As the Court found, though the pdramo covers
only 2 percent of Colombia's territory, it provides drinking water to 70
percent of Colombia's residents and plays a key role in climate
mitigation.109 Judicial enforcement of habitat protections for
endangered species can also indirectly support optimal adaptation by
encouraging ecosystem-based adaptation.1 10
As this emerging jurisprudence suggests, domestic governance is
more likely to minimize negative externalities and result in optimal
adaptation (or, at least, prevent maladaptation) if it is backstopped by
judicial review. The scope of judicial review varies across jurisdictions
and depends significantly on the courts' underlying powers and
implementing legislation. However, domestic administrative and
constitutional law generally supplies some of the basic building blocks
to support optimal local adaptation, including evidentiary rules that
consider scientific data (such as long-term climate risks),
interpretative principles (such as the precautionary principle), and
procedural rights (such as the right to access to information and public
participation).
B. Adaptation as a Transboundary or a Global Public Good
As the foregoing discussion shows, in many (if not most) cases,
climate adaptation will be a pure domestic public good governable by
domestic laws. Many local adaptation measures are just that-local: a
housing development on an Australian beach is unlikely to produce
extraction licenses where, applying the precautionary principle, additional exploitation
of groundwater would not be sustainable given the likely long-term effects of climate
change on rainfall and aquifer ability to recharge).
108. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Sala Plena, febrero 8,
2016, Gloria Stella Ortiz Delgado, Sentencia C-035/16 (Colom.).
109. Id. ¶¶ 141-43, 149-50, 156, 160.
110. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 3:01-CV-00640-SI,
2016 WL 2353647, at *7 (D. Or. May 4, 2016) (rejecting federal plan for the management
of the Federal Columbia River Power System, having found, in part, that the latest
biological opinion ignores current climate science); Defs. of Wildlife v. Jewell, No. 14-247-
M-DLC, 2016 WL 1363865, at *29 (D. Mont. Apr. 4, 2016) (holding that federal decision
against listing the wolverine as threatened is arbitrary and capricious, in part because
it ignored the effects of climate change on the species' survival); see also Alaska Oil &
Gas Ass'n v. Jewell, 815 F.3d 544, 550 (9th Cir. 2016) (rejecting challenge by oil and gas
trade associations, Alaska Native corporations and villages, and the state of Alaska
against federal designation of critical habitat for polar bears and recognizing the future
impact of climate change as relevant in the designation).
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negative transboundary externalities, even if it is maladaptive, and
would not justify superimposing a layer of international governance.
However, the country-driven approach will fail to deliver optimal
adaptation if it cannot control significant transboundary or global
externalities or if adaptive capacity depends on international
coordination due to cross-scale or cross-border linkages. This Article
identifies two areas where this will likely be the case: those involving
(1) the water-energy-food nexus and (2) the climate-security nexus. Each
is explored below before turning to the legal framework.
1. Transboundary Public Goods: The Water-Energy-Food Nexus
A key challenge to optimal adaptation is how to protect freshwater
resources, food production, and energy supply from climate change,
especially in view of demographic growth in many vulnerable regions.
Freshwater resources and food security are at particular risk from
climate-induced change, such as extreme droughts.1 1 1 In Africa, for
example, between 350 and 600 million people may be at risk of
increased water stress by 2050, while crop yields from rain-fed
agriculture in some countries could be cut by up to 50 percent by
2020.112 A number of regions are already feeling the impacts of water
scarcity. Starting in 1998, Syria experienced its worst drought in
900 years.1 1 3 China, the world's second-largest wheat producer,.
suffered a once-in-a-century drought in 2010-2011.114 California's
record-breaking drought that began in 2011 decimated the state's
agriculture and ecosystems.115 To be optimal, adaptation in these
111. See IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014, supra note 1, at 14-15, 18; see also
generally Carlo Fezzi et al., The Environmental Impact of Climate Change Adaptation
on Land Use and Water Quality, 5 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 255 (2015) (addressing the
impacts of agricultural adaptation on ecosystems); D. Lobell et al., Climate Trends and
Global Crop Production Since 1980, 333 SCI. 616 (2011) (discussing climate risks to
agriculture).
112. Michel Boko et al., Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Africa, in
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 434-35 (Martin
Parry et al. eds., 2007).
113. NASA Finds Drought in Eastern Mediterranean Worst of Past 900 Years,
NASA (Mar. 1. 2016), https://www.nasa.gov/feature/goddard/2016/nasa-finds-drought-
in-eastern-mediterranean-worst-of-past-900-years [https://perma.cc/J8WB-WBFM]
(archived Aug. 28, 2018).
114. See Stephane Dion, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, Keynote Address
at the Climate Change and Security: Fragile States Conference, The Security
Implications of Climate Change in Fragile States (Mar. 30, 2016), https://www.climate-
diplomacy.org/news/keynote-security-implications-climate-change-fragile-states
[https://perma.ccl7PMY-S28Z] (archived Aug. 27, 2018); Thomas L. Friedman, The Scary
Hidden Stressor, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/03/opinio
n/sunday/friedman-the-scary-hidden-stressor.html [https://perma.ce/4CTM-TXNX]
(archived Aug. 28, 2018).
115. See, e.g., JosUt MEDELLIN-AZUARA ET AL., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE 2016
CALIFORNIA DROUGHT ON AGRICULTURE (2016), https://watershed.ucdavis.edulfiles/Dro
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circumstances requires an understanding of climate impacts and
ecosystem interlinkages inherent in the water-energy-food nexus
concept.116
The risk of maladaptation is made more acute by the fact that
while water and food governance tend to be primarily local, many
communities depend on access to water and food resources that do not
track state boundaries and are not amenable to local regulation.
Globally, there are 286 watersheds and 300 aquifers that cross the
boundaries of two or more states.1 1 7 Shared waters represent about 45
percent of the earth's land surface and support 40 percent of the global
population, but are under threat from pollution, mismanagement, and
climate change.11 8 As discussed below, they can also become a source
of local or regional conflict.11 9 Similarly, global food production is
concentrated in a small number of states: just five countries will
account for at least 70 percent of total exports of key agricultural
commodities in 2025.120 Considering future population growth, up to
5.2 billion people will be dependent on external water and land
resources (and international trade) for their food security, while up to
1.3 billion people in low-income economies (mainly in Africa) may face
long-term food insecurity in 2050.121
ughtReport_20160812.pdf [https://perma.cc/95G4-QGJH] (archived Sept. 12, 2018);
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Agric., New Aerial Survey Identifies More Than 100 Million
Dead Trees in California (Nov. 18, 2016), https://www.usda.gov/media/press-
releases/20 16/11/18/new-aerial-survey-identifies-more- 100-million-dead-trees-california
[https://perma.cclLA5T-2X8Y] (archived Aug. 28, 2018). The federal government
maintains a drought portal to monitor local and global drought impacts. See Drought,
NAT'L INTEGRATED DROUGHT INFO. SYs., https://www.drought.gov/drought/ (last visited
Aug. 28, 2018) [https://perma.cc/RE75-N3FT] (archived Aug. 28, 2018).
116. The water-energy-food nexus construct is also becoming increasingly critical
in the domestic setting, which is often characterized by complex regulatory regimes for
water, energy, and food that have historically evolved in isolation and display a
considerable degree of rigidity.
117. See UNEP-DHI & UNEP, TRANSBOUNDARY RIVER BASINS: STATUS AND
TRENDS 1-2 (2016); Transboundary Waters, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N.,
http://www.fao.org/land-water/water/water-management/transboundary-water-
management/en/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2018) [https://perma.cclT6BW-C4Z3] (archived
Sept. 2, 2018).
118. Transboundary Waters supra note 117. In Africa, 90 percent of all surface
freshwater resources are shared between two or more states. See M. Goulden et al.,
Adaptation to Climate Change in International River Basins in Africa: A Review, 54
HYDROLOGICAL SCI. J. 805, 805 (2009); see also Declan Conway, From Headwater
Tributaries to International River: Observing and Adapting to Climate Variability and
Change in the Nile Basin, 15 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 99, 107 (2005).
119. See infra Part IV.B.2.
120. ORG. FOR EcoN. Coop. & DEV. & FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N.,
AGRICULTURAL OUTLOOK 2016-2025 at 45-46 (2016) [hereinafter OECD-FAO
AGRICULTURAL OUTLOOK].
121. Marianela Fader et al., Spatial Decoupling of Agricultural Production and
Consumption: Quantifying Dependences of Countries on Food Imports Due to Domestic
Land and Water Constraints, 8 ENVT'L. RES. LETTERS 1, 7 (2013). Actual vulnerability is
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In these circumstances, one state's unilateral attempts to adapt
could generate significant negative externalities and make others less
resilient. Increased irrigation by one state, for example, could
jeopardize another state's water and food security. Similarly, one
state's efforts to geoengineer its way out of climate impacts (for
example, by trying to alter the local hydrological or meteorological
cycle) could harm its neighbors. Adaptation studies, however, rarely
consider these transboundary spillovers.12 2
Even though the Parties to the Paris Agreement were aware that
adaptation policies might conflict and "threaten food production"
(Article 2), they opted to follow a "country-driven" approach to
adaptation and have yet to consider-let alone agree on-principles to
align adaptation policies across state boundaries.12 3 Transboundary
governance-similar to the role played by domestic legal frameworks-
could help avert maladaptation across national borders by
internalizing externalities and ensuring coordination of unilateral
state actions.
As the foregoing analysis suggests, climate adaptation should be
treated as a transboundary public good where water or food security
(or both)-which are integrally related to a community's ability to
adapt to a changing climate-depend on access to shared resources.
This includes both instances where one state's measures could
generate negative externalities for its neighbors, or where neither state
acting alone can attain optimal adaptation.
It is important to note, however, that the underlying drivers of
water and food insecurity also include non-climatic factors, such as
population growth and changes in per capita or agricultural water
demand. 124 In fact, in many cases, demographically-driven growth in
demand for freshwater outweighs the climate-induced changes.1 25
Where such additional factors are present, climate change will likely
exacerbate existing challenges and make cooperative adaptation
frameworks all the more necessary. The confluence of climatic and non-
climatic factors is a challenge not only for adaptation law and
governance, but also for the climate finance provisions of the Paris
likely greater in view of recent upward revision of projected population growth. See U.N.
DEP'T. OF ECON. & Soc. AFF., WORLD POPULATION PROSPEcTs: THE 2017 REVISION
(2017), https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/publications/files/wpp20l7_keyfindings.pdf [perma.
cc/5UEF-8NE8] (archived Sept. 19, 2018).
122. See, e.g., Akemi Tanaka et al., Adaptation Pathways of Global Wheat
Production: Importance of Strategic Adaptation to Climate Change, 5 Scl. REP. 1 (2015)
(examining expanded irrigation capacity in wheat-producing countries to maintain
yields).
123. See supra pp. 1046-47.
124. Goulden, supra note 118, at 812, 823.
125. Id.; see also IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014, supra note 1, at 17, 154, 239-40,
251, 381, 386, 505, 513, 552, 679, 714, 718, 740-42, 1067, 1072, 1123.
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Agreement and the fraught discussions over "loss-and-damage"
associated with the adverse effects of climate change.12 6
2. Global Public Goods: The Climate-Security Nexus
In select cases, transboundary impacts of climate change or
maladaptation could be sufficiently widespread to acquire a global
character. As defined in this Article, climate adaptation should be
treated as a global public good where it contributes to the maintenance
of international peace and security.
It is increasingly recognized that climate change makes violent
conflict more likely, especially in fragile or failing states.
12 7 It can
undermine international peace and security in a number of ways,
including by:
1. Increasing scarcity and intensifying local competition over
food, water, and energy (for example, due to drought and crop
failures), which could turn violent and have cross-border
spillovers;
2. Engendering competition over increasingly scarce
transboundary resources (e.g., the Indus or the Nile);
126. See Paris Agreement, supra note 2, art. 8.; see also UNFCCC Decision
1/CP.21, supra note 2, ¶¶ 47-51.
127. For U.N. documents, see, for example, Press Release, Security Council,
Security Council Holds First-Ever Debate on Impact of Climate Change on Peace,
Security, Hearing Over 50 Speakers, U.N. Press Release SC/9000 (Apr. 17, 2007)
[hereinafter 2007 UNSC Press Release]; Press Release, Security Council, Maintenance
of International Peace and Security: Impact of Climate Change, U.N. Press Release
SC/10332 (July 20, 2011) [hereinafter 2011 UNSC Press Release]; U.N. Secretary-
General, Prevention of Armed Conflict, ¶¶ 37, 114-15, U.N. Doc. A/55/985-S/2001/574
(June 7, 2001); U.N. Secretary-General, The Relationship Between the United Nations
and Regional Organizations, in Particular the African Union, in the Maintenance of
International Peace and Security, ¶ 67, U.N. Doc. S/2008/186** (Apr. 8, 2009); U.N.
Secretary-General, Enhancing Mediation and Its Support Activities, ¶ 63, U.N. Doc.
S/2009/189 (Apr. 8, 2009). For IPCC discussion, see, for example, IPCC, CLIMATE
CHANGE 2014, supra note 1, at 20, 65, 94 & Ch. 12.5.
For country statements, see, for example, U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., 2014 CLIMATE
CHANGE ADAPTATION ROADMAP (2014) [hereinafter 2014 DOD REPORT]; U.S. DEP'T OF
DEF., NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE-RELATED RISKS AND A CHANGING
CLIMATE (2015); Dion, supra note 114.
See also CTR. FOR CLIMATE & SEC., EPICENTERS OF CLIMATE AND SECURITY: THE
NEW GEOSTRATEGIC LANDSCAPE OF THE ANTHROPOCENE (Caitlin E. Werrell & Francesco
Femia, eds., 2017) [hereinafter CFCS EPICENTERS]; L. ROTTINGER ET AL., A NEW
CLIMATE FOR PEACE: TAKING ACTION ON CLIMATE AND FRAGILITY RISKS, AN
INDEPENDENT REPORT COMMISSIONED BY THE G7 MEMBERS (Adelphi, Int'l Alert, The
Wilson Ctr., & Eur. Union Inst. for Security Stud. eds., 2015).
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3. Submerging coastlines and triggering new disputes over
altered maritime boundaries, territorial seas, sea lanes, and
ocean resources;
4. Unleashing natural disasters, which may destabilize fragile
and conflict-affected states;
5. Triggering unprecedented mass-migrations due to flooding,
disease, desertification, war, and famine, generating
additional conflict; and
6. Weakening the capacity of states to absorb shocks and.resolve
conflicts peacefully.128
Over the past decade, international organizations and
governments have increasingly acknowledged the climate-security
nexus. The UN Security Council placed the issue on its agenda in
2007.129 A number of countries, including in the Sahel, have
recognized the security implications of climate change and natural
resource conflicts in their UNFCCC communications.1 30 Several
developed and developing countries have included these risks in their
national defense plans.13 1 The US military, for example, treats climate
change as a significant strategic threat that could cause "instability in
other countries by impairing access to food and water, damaging
infrastructure, spreading disease, uprooting and displacing large
numbers of people, compelling mass migration, interrupting
commercial activity, or restricting electricity availability." 3 2 The
Pentagon also fears such disruptions could foster terrorism.1 3 3
Climate-induced competition over scarce natural resources has
already been a key driver of violent conflict, especially in Africa.1 34
Water scarcity, in particular, has been at the heart of the deadly
conflicts in Darfur, Syria, and the Sahel.135 In addition to the human
128. See sources cited supra note 127 and accompanying text.
129. 2007 UNSC Press Release, supra note 127.
130. 2011 UNSC Press Release, supra note 127; UNFCCC, Aggregate Effect, supra
note 74, TT 60, 261.
131. 2011 UNSC Press Release, supra note 127.
132. 2014 DOD REPORT, supra note 127, at 4.
133. Id.
134. See 2011 UNSC Press Release, supra note 127.
135. See, e.g., id.; U.N. ENV'T PROGRAMME, ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE IN
SUDAN: AN EXPERT REVIEW (2012); Craig Welch, Climate Change Helped Spark Syrian
War, Study Says, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC (Mar. 2, 2015),
https://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2015/03/150302-syria-war-climate-change-
drought/ [https://perma.cc/N55A-5YSH] (archived Sept. 12, 2018); Naziru Mikailu,
Making Sense of Nigeria's Fulani-Farmer Conflict, BBC NEWS (May 5, 2016),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36139388 [https://perma.cc/X6T3-VWU2]
(archived Sept. 12, 2018).
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costs, there are also costs to the international community in the form
of migration, arms flows, humanitarian aid, and spreading instability.
In 2011, as many as ten UN Security Council-mandated peacekeeping
operations costing $35 billion-half of the global peacekeeping
budget-were deployed to countries where natural resources had
played a key role in conflict.13 6
As such, the need for a supra-national ayer of climate adaptation
governance will depend in part on whether international involvement
in local adaptation (and community resilience) would help remove the
underlying drivers of violent conflict and thereby contribute to
international peace and security.
It should be noted that it is not possible to establish causation
between climate change and conflict: these crises might have erupted
at some point anyway due to non-climactic factors,13 7 and, in many
cases, climatic disturbances will not result in conflict. However, it is
clear that (a) ecological crises can trigger conflicts and (b) climate
change is almost certain to cause many more ecological crises in the
future. While many societies are relatively resilient and can withstand
some climate-induced shocks, this is not true of fragile or failing states.
As former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon noted, climate risks are
heightened in vulnerable regions that face multiple stresses, such as
pre-existing conflict, poverty, weak institutions, or food insecurity.
1 38
Almost half of the countries at high risk of water shortages in the
coming decades are in the Middle East and North Africa-a region that
is already under considerable stress. 1 3 9
Optimal adaptation in these circumstances-measures that can
help societies adjust to the effects of climate change and reduce the
likelihood of violent conflict-is thus a global public good, which
requires international support and governance frameworks. As noted
above, we would expect lack of coordination and free-riding to be more
likely here than in a simple two-state problem, which would result in
even more suboptimal investment in global resilience.
136. See 2011 UNSC Press Release, supra note 127, at UNEP Statement.
137. See supra pp. 1059-60.
138. 2007 UNSC Press Release, supra note 127.
139. Andrew Maddocks et al., Ranking the World's Most Water-Stressed Countries
in 2040, WORLD RES. INST. (Aug. 26, 2015), http://www.wri.org/blog/2015/08/ranking-
world%E2%80%99s-most-water-stressed-countries-2040 [https://perma.cc/A4CU-SQW
E] (archived Sept. 2, 2018).
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V. THE LAW AND GOVERNANCE OF MULTI-LEVEL CLIMATE ADAPTATION:
A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
The foregoing discussion has identified several major gaps in the
prevailing approach to adaptation governance. However, governing a
multi-level public good does not necessarily require inventing new
international institutions or legal frameworks. As explained below, in
many cases, existing principles and institutions can help states
coordinate their efforts, reduce negative externalities, and avoid
competition over diminishing resources. This Part, first, shows how
treaty-based mechanisms and general international law could supply
a framework for international climate adaptation (Parts V.A-V.B).
Second, it addresses enforcement concerns (Part V.C). Finally, it
identifies three priority areas for international law and institution-
building (Part V.D).
A. Treaty Regimes
As discussed above, neighboring states have historically
negotiated treaties to resolve disputes over negative cross-border
externalities (e.g., acid rain) or to peacefully use and manage their
shared resources (e.g., transboundary lakes). Nowadays, a large
number of bilateral or multilateral regimes are in place to govern and
conserve shared transboundary resources, such as river basins.14 0
These treaty regimes are the product of inter-state bargaining
(effectively, a Coasean-style solution), and each reflects the affected
states' particular circumstances and interests. However, they have not
emerged in a vacuum: they are informed by and negotiated against the
background of foundational principles of international law, such as the
no-harm principle and the equitable use principle. These principles
define rights and assign consequences when state actions produce
negative cross-border externalities, as explained in the next
subpart.141
These existing governance structures provide an obvious starting
point to address the transboundary dimensions of climate adaptation
in a given "neighborhood" (such as the 1964 Columbia River Treaty
between Canada and the United States). Treaty regimes and
institutions can transform the structure of state incentives.14 2 As
climate change puts increasing pressure on shared resources, many
agreements will require updating to expressly address climate risks
140. Following thirty-seven acute transboundary water disputes in the last fifty
years, 150 treaties have been signed to make international water-related relationships
more stable and predictable. See Transboundary Waters, supra note 117.
141. See infra Part V.B.
142. Cf. OsTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 40, at 137.
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and align cross-border adaptation policies.14 3 Few studies, however,
currently address climate adaptation in international river basins.
14 4
In addition to changing state incentives, these treaty regimes
provide a template for neighborhoods where no treaties exist. As many
as 158 (or 55 percent) of the world's 286 transboundary river basins
presently lack a framework for cooperative management. 145 Given the
potential for negative cross-border externalities, these areas should be
the focus of international efforts to develop new cooperative,
ecosystem-based adaptation governance, using best practices from
other regions.
The 1997 Watercourses Convention also embodies a number of
customary law principles relating to equitable use, significant harm
avoidance, environmental protection, dispute resolution, as well as
procedural rights, which could be used to elaborate new bilateral or
multilateral arrangements.146 However, the drafters of the
Convention (who commenced their work in the 1960s) did not
anticipate the scale of climatic and non-climatic stressors; today, far
greater emphasis should be placed on precaution and harm
avoidance.14 7
143. See COLUMBIA BASIN REGIONAL ADVISORY COMM., MEETING SUMMARY (2017),
https://engage.gov.bc.calapp/uploads/sites/6/2017/07/2017-06-2o-CBRAC-Meeting-
Summary-2.pdf [https://perma.ccl9VGY-MNA2] (archived Sept. 12, 2018) (discussing
climate impacts on the river as part of treaty review process).
144. Goulden, supra note 118, at 816.
145. Transboundary Waters supra note 117; The Legal Architecture for
Transboundary Waters, U.N. WATERCOURSES CONVENTION,
http://www.unwatercoursesconvention.org/importance/the-legal-architecture-for-
transboundary-waters (last visited Sept. 2, 2018) [https://perma.cc/2ZJY-MNTE]
(archived Sept. 2, 2018); see also UNEP-DHI & UNEP, supra note 117, at 115
(identifying sixty-two basins and 106 basins as "high" and "very high" risk, respectively,
based on whether they are governed by a modern legal framework); Sustainable
Development Goal (SDG) Indicators: Metadata Repository, U.N. STATISTICS DIV.,
https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/metadata (last visited Oct. 15, 2018) [https://perma.cc/Z7CQ-
8T5Z] (archived Oct. 15, 2018) (defining SDG Indicator 6.5.2 (Proportion of
Transboundary Basin Area with an Operational Arrangement for Water Cooperation) as
"the proportion of transboundary basins area within a country with an operational
arrangement for water cooperation," and finding that "cooperation is in most cases not
advanced").
146. Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses
arts. 8, 9, 12, May 21, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 700 (entered into force Aug. 17, 2014); see also
Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International
Lakes, Mar. 17, 1992, 1936 U.N.T.S. 269 [hereinafter UNECE Water Convention]. On
transboundary aquifers, see The Law of Transboundary Aquifers, G.A. Res. 66/104, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/66/104 (Dec. 9, 2011) (encouraging states, inter alia, "to make appropriate
bilateral or regional arrangements for the proper management of their transboundary
aquifers"); G.A. Res. 63/124, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/124 (Dec. 11, 2008) (taking note of 2008
Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers).
147. Cf. K. Conca et al., Global Regime Formation or Complex Institution
Building? The Principled Content of International River Agreements, 50 INT'L STUD. Q.
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Even modern agreements do not always necessarily reflect the
needs of climate adaptation. For example, the Zambezi Watercourse
Commission Agreement, concluded in 2004 to promote equitable and
reasonable use of water resources and sustainable development of the
Zambezi basin (one of the most vulnerable basins in Africa), does not
fully consider the risks associated with more extreme floods and
droughts due to the changing climate.1 48 In addition, economic
assessments of hydropower and irrigation projects are yet to factor in
the full value of ecosystem goods and services.14 9 In this sense, climate
adaptation highlights the need for convergence between international
environmental and water law-two congruent regimesl50 that have for
too long evolved in silos.
Beyond shared freshwater resources, which have seen significant
efforts at transboundary coordination, new bilateral or regional
agreements could also contribute to sustainable management of other
aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems (a) where one state's adaptation
measures would have knock-on effects on another state's resilience
(negative externalities), or, (b) where neither state's measures, taken
in isolation, are likely to produce optimal adaptation (positive
externalities). Forest ecosystems are one area where greater
transboundary coordination may be needed not only with respect to
climate mitigation,15 1 but also water management.15 2 Regional seas,
like the Caribbean, and regional fish stocks are other candidate
areas.1 5 3 There is thus scope for both institutional change and
institution building.
263, 267 (2006) (noting tension between "no significant harm" and "equitable use"
principles).
148. U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, OPPORTUNITIES AND
OPTIONS FOR ENHANCING ADAPTATION ACTIONS AND SUPPORTING THEIR
IMPLEMENTATION: REDUCING VULNERABILITY AND MAINSTREAMING ADAPTATION
(TECHNICAL PAPER) ¶ 19 (2016),
http://unfece.int/files/adaptation/groups-committees/adaptation committee/application/
pdf/tp-adaptation 2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/BBY8-2FJV] (archived Sept. 2, 2018).
149. Id.
150. See generally Maria L. Banda, Regime Congruence: Rethinking the Scope of
State Responsibility for Transboundary Environmental Harm, 103 MINN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2019) [hereinafter Banda, Regime Congruence].
151. See also Paris Agreement, supra note 2, art. 5(2) (encouraging "alternative
policy approaches, such as joint mitigation and adaptation approaches for the integral
and sustainable management of forests").
152. Almost one-third of the world's watersheds have lost more than 75 percent of
their forest cover. Conca, supra note 147, at 264.
153. Many regional seas are governed by treaties. See, e.g., Convention for the
Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region
(Cartagena Convention), Mar. 24, 1983, 1506 U.N.T.S. 157. However, as with freshwater
regimes, these treaties require updating and greater enforcement capacity.
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B. General International Law
In many cases, no treaty-based transboundary resource-sharing
regimes exist, and they are also not likely to be negotiated soon-due
to high transaction costs, a large number of parties, concerns about
free-riding, or other political barriers or populist concerns. However, a
lack of formal institutions such as those described in the preceding
subpart does not mean there is a legal vacuum. General international
law can still aid optimal adaptation, though it might not always supply
clear answers.
As noted above, general international law defines rights (e.g., to
sovereign territory), imposes liability (for exceeding those rights and
encroaching on another's sovereignty), and thus limits the range of
appropriate state conduct.1 54 As relevant in this context, it does not
permit states to conduct or allow activities within their territory, or in
common spaces, without regard for the rights of other states or for the
protection of the general environment.155 This principle translates into
two related duties-to prevent, reduce, and control transboundary
environmental harm, and to cooperate in mitigating risks of such
harm. These duties inform the content of treaty regimes and also offer
guidance in the formulation of new adaptation policies. In a sense, they
define the range of acceptable bargains and set the direction in which
compensation should flow (i.e., from the wrongdoer to the wronged
party).156
The no-harm principle is a foundational element of international
law. As the tribunal in the seminal Trail Smelter arbitration between
the United States and Canada-the first sovereign dispute over air
pollution-famously ruled, no state has the right to use or permit the
use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or
to the territory of another or the properties or persons therein, when
the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear
and convincing evidence.157
The duty to prevent transboundary environmental harm has since
been reaffirmed in numerous decisions and become firmly entrenched
in the corpus of customary international law.15 8 It is also a core feature
154. Cf. BARRETT, supra note 55, at 132 ("Many of the rules of any particular
cooperation game are determined by the metagame of customary law.").
155. See generally PATRICIA BIRNIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 137 (3d ed. 2009).
156. Cf. BARRETT, supra note 55, at 122 (noting Coase's argument that the
direction of an externality depends on the initial allocation of rights).
157. Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), Award, 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1965 (Mar. 11,
1941).
158. See, e.g., Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. 226, 241-42 (July 8) ("The existence of the general obligation of States to
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of
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of many multilateral environmental regimes, including the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Convention on
Biological Diversity.1 59 Generally, states incur responsibility for
transboundary harm if they are objectively at fault (i.e., if they failed
to act with due care or diligence, if they acted in breach of a treaty, or
if they committed a prohibited act).160
These principles apply with equal force to transboundary
adaptation. Where a state knows, or should reasonably know or
foresee, that its planned adaptation measures could cause serious
harm to another state's environment (for example, by depleting natural
resources or aggravating climate change), that state has a duty to
prevent, reduce, and control the potential harm. A failure to honor that
duty could attract international responsibility under customary law
(and any applicable treaty law)-the consequences of which are
discussed in Part V.C below.
Second, the duty to prevent transboundary environmental harm
entails a concomitant duty to cooperate with the potentially affected
states.16 1 As the World Court stated, "by co-operating .. . the States
concerned can manage the risks of damage to the environment that
might be created by the plans initiated by one or [the] other of them,
so as to prevent the damage in question."162 Related to this duty are
procedural obligations relating to notification, consultation, and risk
assessment. Thus, where the risk of transboundary harm exists due to
the state's activities or lack of action, the state would be required to
undertake an environmental impact assessment in cooperation with
the potentially affected state(s). A failure to do so could give rise to
international responsibility.16 3
Applied to the adaptation context, this means that a state
contemplating certain measures (e.g., building a hydroelectric dam,
syphoning off freshwater) has a duty to assess the transboundary
environmental impact of its project in cooperation with the
downstream states. Under customary international law, the
other States or of areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of international
law relating to the environment."); see also Gabdikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung/Slovk),
1997 I.C.J. 7, 67, 77-78 (Sept. 25); Pulp Mills on River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), 2010
I.C.J. 14, T 101 (Apr. 20); Certain Activities Carried out by Nicaragua in Border Area
(Costa Rica v. Nicar.) / Construction of Road in Costa Rica Along San Juan River (Nicar.
v. Costa Rica), 2015 I.C.J. 1, ¶ 104 (Dec. 16).
159. See also South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), PCA Case No. 2013-19,
Award, TT 941, 944, 959 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016).
160. Alan Boyle, Globalising Environmental Liability: The Interplay of National
and International Law, 17 J. ENVTL. L. 3, 3-5 (2005).
161. See, e.g., South China Sea, PCA Case No. 2013-19, T 985 n.1181.
162. Pulp Mills, 2010 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 77.
163. See infra Part V.C.
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downstream states do not have the right to veto the project but would
be entitled to reparations if they suffer significant injury.1 64
In a real-world dispute, obligations under other legal regimes
could be triggered, such as human rights law, if one state's measures
threatened another's citizens-an issue I explore elsewhere.16 5 To
avoid normative conflict, optimal adaptation will also require that
these principles be mainstreamed in other legal regimes. International
trade and investment law, for example, could act as a potential source
of policy incoherence by reducing the scope of state discretion over
adaptation (as certain regulatory measures could give rise to
investment or trade claims).
1 66
A different approach, however, would apply in those cases
involving the climate-security nexus where the potential source of
instability is entirely domestic. There, treaty regimes and general
international law do not impose a duty on the international community
to act: their interest is moral or political. However, in such matters,
collective self-interest may counsel concerted international action-
even in the absence of immediate transboundary effects or legal
duties-to help communities address climate-related root causes of
conflict and prevent externalities.
C. Enforcement
International law thus provides a coherent framework to guide
state efforts on adaptation in the context of transboundary or global
public goods, but can it make a difference? It could be objected that
international law lacks enforcement capacity. As noted, this is a major
distinction between the domestic and the international legal realm
that complicates public goods provision.16 7 Moreover, even where such
enforcement mechanisms exist and rights are in theory clearly defined,
in practice states rarely bring inter-state claims in environmental
matters.16 8 Most disputes are resolved politically.
But this does not mean that investment in developing legal
institutions and regimes is pointless. If disputes are generally resolved
politically, whether through carrots (e.g., distributional incentives) or
sticks (e.g., economic or reputational consequences), this is so in part
because institutions, rules, and principles exist that can steer the
164. See Lake Lanoux Arbitration (Fr. v. Spain), 12 R.I.A.A. 281, ¶ 11 (Perm. Ct.
Arb. 1957); see also infra Part V.C.
165. See Banda, Regime Congruence, supra note 150.
166. See, e.g., MICHAEL TREBILCOCK ET AL., THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 684-86 (4th ed. 2013) (discussing potential trade linkages); see also infra note
176.
167. See supra pp. 1042, 1044.
168. See Banda, Regime Congruence, supra note 150.
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dispute towards a particular outcome. Legal regimes and norms define
the range of appropriate behavior. To the extent that states respond to
the "logic of appropriateness"16 9 (i.e., to a common standard of what
constitutes internationally responsible behavior), we would expect
them to refrain from taking actions that would invite international
opprobrium.
But even if states respond predominantly to the "logic of
consequences,"1 70 a less charitable view, we would still expect them to
seek a negotiated settlement. States face multiple equilibria in a
dynamic multi-stage game, not a simple Prisoner's Dilemma. They will
rarely face the same set of players, or the same unidirectional
externalities. There are multiple iterations involving multiple parties
and multiple externalities, such that the wrongdoing state in one
iteration may be wronged in another. Through practice, states create
precedents, and bad precedents can harm their future interests. This
creates an intrinsic interest in rule compliance.1 7 1 Thus, though there
is no higher authority to impose order from above, and despite
difficulties with implementation and enforcement, a degree of restraint
and respect for legal norms is embedded in the international system by
virtue of self-interest.1 72 (This is another distinction between inter-
state bargaining and the Coasean model involving private parties in
the domestic context, which does not work via self-policing or
precedent.)
However, for self-policing to work, states have to be conscious not
only of the risk of cross-border externalities, but also of the
applicability of particular legal norms. Currently, it is not clear that
they are aware of either.1 7 3 Existing institutions, such as the
UNFCCC, could fill an important function by raising awareness of
adaptation co-benefits, coordinating state actions, and broadcasting
and reaffirming the relevance of common rules. This is particularly
169. See generally JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN, REDISCOVERING
INSTITUTIONS (1989) [hereinafter MARCH & OLSEN, REDISCOVERING INSTITUTIONS];
James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The Institutional Dynamics of International Political
Orders, 52 INT'L ORG. 943 (1998). For similar thinking, see Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do
Nations Obey International Law? 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997).
170. See MARCH & OLSEN, REDISCOVERING INSTITUTIONS, supra note 169.
171. Cf. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960) (advancing the
theory that in games with multiple equilibria, "focal points," such as environmental,
cultural, or historical factors and precedent, can focus the players' attention on one
equilibrium and lead them to expect it, influencing subsequent behavior). Legal rules
can have the focal-point effect. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners
Dilemma: Coordination, Game Theory, and Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 209, 234 (2009)
("Legal actors can influence behavior merely by creating self-fulfilling expectations that
the legally obligatory behavior will occur."). But see Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner,
A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113 (1999) (explaining
customary international law solely as a reflection of state self-interest).
172. The Montreal Protocol's stabilization of ozone-depleting substances is a
commonly-cited success story.
173. See supra Part II.
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important since actors might refuse to cooperate without assurances
that others will do the same.174 If states believe they will receive
benefits (which can include carrots in the form of financing or side
payments), they will be more likely to cooperate. And cooperation can
beget cooperation through reciprocity.
175 Moreover, while the climate
regime (and most resource-focused treaty regimes) does not provide for
coercion, other regimes, such as trade, do. Those adjacent institutions,
or bilateral relationships, could be leveraged as a stick to help enforce
principles on climate adaptation much in the same way as they are
used in other environmental disputes.
176
D. Risks of Overreach
That said, not every transboundary impact calls for
transboundary governance. In an interconnected world, the ripple
effects of many domestic policies will be felt across the border, but that
does not by itself justify superimposing an extra layer of governance.
As the above discussion suggests, the case for transboundary
governance is strongest in the following three situations: first, where
climate adaptation requires access to shared transboundary resources
(which will often already be governed by treaty regime); second, where
local adaptation measures risk having direct and significant negative
transboundary externalities; and, third, where individual states,
acting in isolation, cannot ensure optimal adaptation. This is
particularly true of the use and management of shared water
resources, such as aquifers, lakes, basins, or deltas, but also cross-
174. See, e.g., Amartya K. Sen, Isolation, Assurance and the Social Rate of
Discount, 81 Q.J. ECON. 112, 114 (1967) (In "assurance games," expectations about other
people's behavior affect strategy: "If everyone has implicit faith in everyone else doing
the 'right' thing..., then it will be in everyone's interest to do the right thing .... [If] each
individual has complete assurance that the other will do B, there is no problem of
compulsory enforcement."); cf. Chapman, supra note 39, at 147 (in "conditional co-
operation," players will contribute more as they are assured of fellow players'
cooperation, on whose behavior their own is conditional).
175. See, e.g., Robert Sugden, The Supply of Public Goods Through Voluntary
Contributions, 94 ECON. J. 772, 783 (1984) (reciprocity theory predicts that each person
tends to contribute more as others contribute more to public goods and charitable
activities); cf. Joyce Berg et al., Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History, 10 GAMES & ECON.
BEHAV. 122 (1995).
176. See, e.g., UNFCCC, supra note 57, art. 3(5) (contemplating the use of
"unilateral" measures to combat climate change). Clarifying the interaction between the
climate regime and the trade and investment regimes is outside the scope of the present
analysis. On effectiveness of environmentally-based trade sanctions and border tax
adjustments, see generally DANIEL BODANSKY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE
LAW 327-49 (2017); MICHAEL TREBILCOCK ET AL., THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 658-60, 686-91 (4th ed. 2013). On investment law, see, for example, Jorge E
Vifiuales, Foreign Investment and the Environment in International Law: An Ambiguous
Relationship, 80 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 244 (2010).
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border forests, terrestrial ecosystems, and ocean resources that are
essential to local food security. As discussed above, international law
offers the basic principles that could be used to address these situations
and align adaptation efforts across state boundaries.
The argument for transboundary governance is less strong where
the transboundary impact of local adaptation measures is indirect or
not otherwise governed by international law. For example, if a country
decides to protect its food security by restricting grain exports, its trade
policies could increase food prices in import-dependent countries.17 7
The affected state's degree of dependence on food imports-and
vulnerability to these indirect effects-will be a function of many
variables, including its demographic growth, governance, resource
management, and agricultural and economic policy.1 7 8 In this
scenario, it would be difficult to argue that the exporting state's
domestic food policy should be subject to international control, though
a case for international cooperation could be made.1 7 9 The same is true
of access to water or energy resources. For example, to meet its local
adaptation needs, a country could reasonably decide to restrict the
right of foreign companies to bottle and export its freshwater resources
or to use its arable land (though, as noted above, this could have
repercussions under investment law).
VI. CONCLUSION
How to ensure the provision of public goods has posed a significant
challenge for our legal and political institutions. This is especially true
of public goods that cross multiple jurisdictional lines and lie beyond
177. A number of countries resorted to these measures during the 2007-08 and
2010-11 food crises. See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. Coop. & DEV., Impact of Agricultural
Export Restrictions on Prices in Importing Countries, Joint Working Party on Agric. &
Trade, OECD Doe. TAD/TC/CA/WP(2017)1/FINAL (2017) (noting "varying effectiveness"
of export restrictions in stabilizing domestic prices and finding variable long-term impact
on trading partners). For a discussion of indirect transnational risks, see also W. N.
Adger et al., Nested and Teleconnected Vulnerabilities to Environmental Change, 7
FRONTIERS ECOLOGY & ENV'T 150 (2009) (applying concept of "nested and teleconnected
vulnerability" to describe vulnerabilities of social-ecological systems that are linked
across different localities and scales); Schenker & Stephan, supra note 12, at 45
(proposing adaptation as a strategy to offset climate-induced terms-of-trade effects
transferred via integrated markets); Magnus Benzie et al., Introducing the
Transnational Climate Impacts Index: Indicators of Country-Level Exposure (Stockholm
Env't Inst. Working Paper No. 2016-07, 2016) (finance and trade "pathways" can
transmit climate risks across markets and supply chains).
178. See supra pp. 1052-53, 1059-60; see also UNFCCC LEG, NATIONAL
ADAPTATION PLANS, supra note 83, at 71.
179. But see Michael Trebilcock & Kristen Pue, The Puzzle of Agricultural
Exceptionalism in International Trade Policy, 18 J. INT'L ECON. L. 233, 237, 247-50
(2015) (arguing that trade measures, including export restrictions, are "blunt




the control of any particular layer of government, such as high-seas
fisheries, biodiversity, or a stable climate. As this Article has sought to
illustrate using the case of climate adaptation, it is possible to optimize
legal design for the provision of such multi-level public goods once we
recognize their true nature and identify the basic barriers to
cooperation. With this analytical framework in place, it will be possible
to study the institutional design and/or forms of private contracting
required to ensure the optimal provision of other multi-level public
goods at the intersection of domestic and international law.
The recognition that climate adaptation is a multi-level public
good, as this Article has argued, also has specific policy implications
for how adaptation is governed and financed. The provision of an
important transboundary, or global, public good cannot be left to
unilateral efforts of individual states; it requires international legal
and governance frameworks and more coherent, targeted adaptation
finance. It further suggests that a one-size-fit-all approach to
adaptation will not work. Legal design will have to accommodate
multi-level risks and externalities, while recognizing the need for local
implementation and community involvement.1 8 0 While adaptation
planning will largely remain a locally-owned and country-driven
process, as reflected in the UNFCCC regime's philosophy, the strong
transboundary dimensions of the water-energy-food nexus and the
global dimensions of the climate-security nexus, especially in
vulnerable regions, require a rethinking of adaptation law and
governance. The management of climate adaptation in shared
watersheds, forests, or navigation pathways is unimaginable without
cross-border coordination, as individual states, left to their own
devices, are unlikely to produce optimal adaptation. This Article has
identified three priority areas where this is the case.
1 81
As the foregoing discussion shows, multi-level adaptation
governance will not necessarily require the creation of new governance
institutions, as existing treaty regimes and general international law
already provide considerable guidance. The first step is to reaffirm and
remind states that-in the adaptation context, as elsewhere-they
have a duty to prevent transboundary environmental harm to other
states and to engage in international cooperation where their actions
risk having significant transboundary impacts.
Thus far, UNFCCC bodies have not called on Parties to coordinate
their adaptation plans or to take steps to ensure that their adaptation
activities do not result in transboundary harm, and only "[a] few
Parties" have planned to address transboundary issues in their
180. Cf. Dietz et al., supra note 40, at 1910 (advocating institutions that are
"complex, redundant, and nested in many layers" to manage global commons).
181. See supra p. 1070.
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communications.1 82 Parties will have a chance to decide whether they
wish to include some form of regional cooperation in a future guidance
document on adaptation18 3 and whether they wish to entrust the
Adaptation Committee with carrying out that mandate.18 4 In
particular, the Parties should signal a change of direction, including at
the upcoming 24th Conference of the Parties in Katowice, Poland
(COP24), by emphasizing the importance of transboundary adaptation
measures and promoting integrated, ecosystem-based, and cooperative
approaches to shared climate risk- and resource-management.
Second, with respect to adaptation finance, the recognition that
country-driven adaptation measures may result in maladaptation and
generate negative externalities (through market failures,
environmental degradation, mass migration, and conflict) could make
the Parties more willing to mobilize funds and help vulnerable
countries build resilience to climate shocks before the worst projections
materialize. In some cases, international cooperation on adaptation is
182. UNFCCC, supra note 57, 1 65; see also U.N. Framework Convention on
Climate Change, Adaptation-Related Information Included in Nationally Determined
Contributions, National Adaptation Plans and Recent National Communication, ¶ 28,
U.N. Doc. FCCC/TP/2017/7 (Oct. 2 2017) (noting that some Parties have highlighted
their intended efforts to "cooperat[e] on transboundary waters") [https://perma.cc/M8M9-
XEAP archived 9/2/201-8].
183. See Ad Hoc Working Grp. on the Paris Agreement, Draft Elements for APA
Agenda Item 4 (Further Guidance in Relation to the Adaptation Communication,
Including, inter alia, as a Component of NDCs, Referred to in Article 7, Paragraphs 10
and 11, of the Paris Agreement), Informal Note by the Co-Facilitators-Final Iteration
(May 9, 2018), https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/APAl-5-IN-i4_3.pdfdown
load [https://perma.cc/ZAK7-4GKF] (archived Sept. 2, 2018).
184. The Adaptation Committee's mandate is limited by the Parties' Agreement.
In 2015, it was requested to develop methodologies for reviewing the adequacy and
effectiveness of adaptation and support. See UNFCCC Decision 1/CP.21, supra note 2,
TT 41, 42, 45, 130. The Adaptation Committee presented its recommendations on this
subject in 2017. See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the
Subsidiary Body for Implementation on its Forty-Seventh Session, ¶¶ 77-78, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/SBI/2017/19 (Jan. 31, 2018), https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/docs/
2017/sbileng/19.pdf [https://perma.cc/AFT7-LDRP] (archived Oct. 15, 2018) (discussing
Adaptation Committee's technical work and recommendations). At this point, it is up to
the Parties, acting with the UNFCCC subsidiary bodies, to decide whether to extend or
expand the Adaptation Committee's mandate via a new request issued at COP24. See
id. ¶ 80. The draft negotiating documents discussing the Adaptation Committee's
mandate do not presently disclose an intention to move in this direction. See, e.g., U.N.
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Elements of Draft Text Under SBI Agenda
Item 12 and SBSTA Agenda Item 4, 'Report of the Adaptation Committee' Revised
Informal Note by the Co-Facilitators (Nov. 14, 2017),
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/bonnnov2017/insession/application/pdf/sb47_isbil2_is
bst4_ainformal note ac_.pdf [https://perma.cclUET4-QS3Y] (archived Oct. 15, 2018)
(summarizing views expressed by some of the Parties during informal consultations and
recommendations prepared by the Adaptation Committee); see also U.N. Framework
Convention on Climate Change, Draft Decision Text on Matters Referred to in
Paragraphs 41, 42 and 45 of Decision 1/CP.21 (Sept. 8, 2018), https://unfccc.int/sites/
default/files/resource/DTAC-LDCs-v8Sep.pdf [https://perma.cc/E65Z-W2GK] (archived
Oct. 15, 2018) (outlining current state of negotiations on different mandates). The
Adaptation Committee is developing its new workplan.
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a (self-interested) investment in international peace and security.
Likewise, the recognition that positive externalities of adaptation may
be undervalued in the absence of transboundary cooperation may
support better cost-and-benefit-sharing agreements.
International governance mechanisms, however, need to be placed
on a sounder, evidence-based methodological footing if they are to
result in optimal adaptation.18 5 For example, Parties should be
required to address transboundary dimensions of adaptation in their
adaptation communications under the Paris Agreement or requests for
adaptation funding, including: (a) shared natural resources and shared
climate risks; (b) potential adverse impacts of domestic adaptation
measures on other states; and (c) potential adverse domestic impacts
of other states' adaptation measures.
This data-while likely controversial among some countries-
would help the funding bodies, the Adaptation Committee, and the
affected regions and countries plan for and preempt climate risks and
direct international support and finance to where they are most
needed. To encourage compliance, access to adaptation finance could
additionally be conditioned on a party's willingness to cooperate with
other potentially affected states and to respect international law.
Though grounded in basic norms of international law, appending such
criteria to funding would also likely prove controversial in view of
current practices.18 6
In addition, it will be important to develop a methodology to
disaggregate climatic from non-climatic factors that can reduce a
society's resilience, such as bad governance or demographic growth, as
non-climatic factors may require a different policy approach and
different financing channels.18 7
In grappling with the transboundary and global dimensions of
climate change, however, the international community needs to guard
against the risks of overreach (i.e., of extending the scope of
transboundary governance mechanisms too far into the local realm).
As this Article has argued, many adaptation measures are purely local
and do not warrant international supervision. Identifying the
185. See supra note 79.
186. That said, some funding bodies already do consider transboundary impacts in
their funding criteria. See, e.g., GREEN CLIMATE FUND, ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL




[https://perma.cc/2FEZ-DEVW] (archived Oct. 15, 2018) (in case of potential
transboundary impacts of GCF-funded projects, committing to undertake "all necessary
consultations and due diligence processes, including prior notification and consultations
with the relevant stakeholders, including addressing their comments"); see also id. ¶¶ 2,
68bis (committing to develop modalities to resolve neighboring countries' concerns about
"potential transboundary environmental and social impacts").
187. On the interplay between climatic and non-climatic factors, see supra pp.
1059-60.
10732018]
VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
circumstances in which local actions can have unforeseen
transboundary or global impactsI8 8-and designing legal mechanisms
to encourage state cooperation in different contexts-is thus a key
research and policy priority.
188. Cf. Oran R. Young et al., The Globalization of Socio-Ecological Systems: An
Agenda for Scientific Research, 16 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 304, 313 (2006).
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